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A multinational enterprise (“MNE”) may use cross-border
earnings stripping as a tax planning strategy. This strategy
involves a higher-tax affiliate making deductible payments to a
low- or zero-tax affiliate to reduce the MNE’s global effective tax
rate and, in the process, erode the corporate tax bases of
countries where its economic activity otherwise would be more
highly taxed. Earnings stripping the U.S. corporate tax base is a
major objective of U.S. corporations that engage in “inversion”
transactions to become a subsidiary in a foreign-parented group.
This Article explains how the earnings stripping problem extends
beyond corporate inversions to U.S. subsidiaries of foreignparent groups regardless of how the group was formed and is
independent of the controversy regarding whether the United
States should adopt a territorial system. The Article develops a
theoretical framework for analyzing earnings stripping and
identifying the scope of an appropriate response. The Article
further grapples with developing workable rules to implement its
theoretical policy prescriptions. The Article’s analysis supports
limiting the deductibility of cross-border interest payments by a
* Copyright © 2015 by J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay.
All rights reserved. For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article, we thank Yariv
Brauner, C. Bryan Cloyd, Lisa De Simone, Omri Marian, Stuart Singer, and participants
in a taxation law panel of the Law & Society Association annual meeting in Minneapolis
in May 2014, participants at a taxation in a global economy research symposium,
cosponsored by the University of Texas McCombs School of Business and the Waterloo
Centre at the University of Waterloo, in Austin in September 2014, participants in a
seminar at the Institute for Austrian and International Tax Law of the Vienna University
of Economics and Business in Vienna in October 2014, and participants at a tax policy
colloquium presentation at the University of Minnesota Law School in February 2015.
** Ernest L. Wilkinson Chair and Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School,
Brigham Young University.
*** Fondren Foundation Centennial Chair for Faculty Excellence and Professor of
Law, The University of Texas School of Law. Professor Peroni dedicates this Article to his
loving parents, Betty Peroni and the late Emil Peroni for their tremendous support and
inspiration over the years. Professor Peroni also thanks the University of Texas School of
Law for its generous research support.
**** Professor of Practice, Harvard Law School.

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 673 (2015)

674

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

U.S. subsidiary with respect to intra-MNE debt to the
subsidiary’s proportionate share of the MNE’s worldwide debt
owed to unrelated parties. The Article’s analysis also supports
treating the proper taxation of cross-border services fees as
primarily a transfer pricing issue but justifies a source
withholding tax as a device for dividing revenue between the
source and residence countries. Finally, the Article advances
understanding of the proper taxation of royalties paid by a U.S.
subsidiary to a foreign member of an MNE but concludes that
the ultimate resolution of that issue requires further work.
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INTRODUCTION
A multinational enterprise (“MNE”) may use cross-border
earnings stripping as a tax planning strategy. This strategy involves a
higher-tax affiliate making deductible payments to a low- or zero-tax
affiliate to reduce the MNE’s global effective tax rate and, in the
process, erode the corporate tax bases of countries where its
economic activity otherwise would be more highly taxed. Earnings
stripping the U.S. corporate tax base is a major objective of U.S.
corporations that engage in an “inversion” transaction to become a
subsidiary in a foreign-parented group, thus allowing the deductible
payments strategy to work without running afoul of U.S. antiavoidance rules in Subpart F1 and other provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code.2 This is because the deductible payments save tax by
shifting U.S.-source income to low-tax countries, and corporate
inversions are an effective way to create the U.S. subsidiary/foreign
parent structure that makes the deductible payments possible. Hence,
most of the current discussion of earnings stripping occurs in the
context of how to tackle the inversion problem.
In this Article, we explain that although earnings stripping is
appropriately an important part of the inversion conversation, it has
1. See generally I.R.C. §§ 951–64 (2012) (detailing the anti-deferral rules relating to
controlled foreign corporations).
2. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(j) (2012) (containing earnings stripping deduction
limitations only for interest payments and only if certain triggers are met, discussed infra
text accompanying notes 206–27).
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additional critical effects. Those effects extend beyond corporate
inversions to U.S. subsidiaries of foreign-parented groups regardless
of how the group was formed. Those effects will continue to present a
broad challenge to the U.S. system for taxing cross-border income
even if inversions are curtailed. This Article also explains that
earnings stripping is a threat to the U.S. tax base regardless of
whether the United States (1) adopts a real worldwide income tax
system that eschews deferral and substantial cross-crediting, (2)
adopts an explicit territorial system, or (3) continues with its present
bollixed system that appears to be a worldwide system but largely
functions as an unduly complex, incoherent, and elective de facto
territorial regime. Thus, the unresolved controversy regarding overall
system design is not a reason to postpone developing remedies for the
earnings stripping problem.
To identify appropriate remedies, however, it is first necessary to
determine what is objectionable about earnings stripping, and that
quest is inhibited by the fact that U.S.-source taxation, to which
earnings stripping is a threat, is an under-theorized topic.
Consequently, this Article develops a theoretical framework for
analyzing earnings stripping and identifying the scope of an
appropriate response to the earnings stripping problem. The Article
then considers workable and policy-relevant ways to implement its
theoretical prescriptions. In our judgment, the likelihood of the
emergence of an effective multilateral approach to earnings stripping
is remote. Thus, the United States must develop appropriate rules in
light of its own tax system and interests, although seeking
international cooperation in areas where it can be achieved will
certainly further those interests.
The Article proceeds in Part I by providing a background that
gives context to the earnings stripping issue both within and beyond
the corporate inversion problem. Part II develops a theoretical
framework for determining both the detriments of earnings stripping
and the appropriate responses. Part III then confronts the problem of
translating theoretical analysis into workable, real-world solutions.
Part IV addresses the question of whether revenue realities allow us
to ignore the earnings stripping problem and argues that they do not.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Real Worldwide Taxation Revisited
In our prior work,3 we have argued that the United States should
adopt a real worldwide system for taxing the foreign income of a U.S.
MNE.4 Under a real worldwide system, the foreign-source and U.S.source income of a U.S. parent corporation and all of its controlled
foreign subsidiaries would be aggregated and subjected to a current,
non-deferred U.S. income tax with a credit for foreign income tax
paid thereon to the extent that the foreign tax did not exceed the
applicable U.S. tax. In addition, foreign tax imposed by high-tax
foreign countries in excess of U.S. tax could not be cross-credited
against the U.S. residual tax on income earned in low-tax foreign
countries. This approach would greatly ameliorate distortion of the
choice between the United States and low-tax foreign countries as the
location for business or investment activity,5 would end the so-called
lockout effect of current law,6 would align U.S. international income
taxation more closely with the ability-to-pay principle that underlies
the choice of income as the primary U.S. federal tax base,7 and would
3. See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Perspectives
on the Worldwide vs. Territorial Taxation Debate, 125 TAX NOTES 1079, 1081 (2009)
[hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Perspectives]; Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming,
Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Income Tax on
Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REV. 455, 458 (1999) [hereinafter Peroni, Fleming &
Shay, Getting Serious].
4. The most basic MNEs are a parent/subsidiary structure or a pair of corporations
whose stock is owned by the same party or parties (i.e., the brother/sister structure). There
are virtually endless combinations and permutations of these basic patterns. For purposes
of this Article, an MNE is a parent/subsidiary group of corporations that functions as an
economic unit with at least one member being engaged in business activity outside the
country in which the MNE parent is a resident for tax purposes.
5. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR TAXING U.S. MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS 20 (2013) [hereinafter CBO, OPTIONS]; STAFF OF J. COMM. ON
TAXATION, JCX-42-11, PRESENT LAW AND ISSUES IN U.S. TAXATION OF CROSSBORDER INCOME 103 (2011) [hereinafter J. COMM., CROSS-BORDER INCOME]; Fleming,
Peroni & Shay, Perspectives, supra note 3, at 1084–85.
6. See CBO, OPTIONS, supra note 5, at 20; J. COMM., CROSS-BORDER INCOME,
supra note 5, at 103; J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Eviscerating the Foreign
Tax Credit Limitations and Cutting the Repatriation Tax – What’s ETI Repeal Got to Do
with It?, 104 TAX NOTES 1393, 1406, 1414 (2004) [hereinafter Fleming & Peroni,
Eviscerating].
7. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Perspectives, supra note 3, at 1091–1101; J. Clifton
Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in International Taxation: The
Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 299, 328–33 (2001)
[hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness]; see also AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING
THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE 8–15 (2013) (tracing the rise of the ability-topay concept as a fundamental pillar of taxation in the United States).
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allow the United States to collect a residual tax8 on income earned by
U.S. MNEs in low-tax foreign countries at a time when the U.S.
Treasury is in need of increased revenue. Stiff resistance to achieving
these goals comes from opponents who seek to exclude foreignsource business income from the U.S. tax base, and a lively and
important debate has resulted.9
B.

Corporate Inversions

Among the arguments made by opponents of the real worldwide
taxation that we propose is that U.S. MNEs could readily defeat such
a regime by reorganizing into foreign-controlled MNEs—a tactic
referred to as corporate inversion.10 The United States partially
addressed this concern with the enactment of statutory rules
discouraging inversions in 2004.11 While these rules have had a
substantial restrictive effect,12 in recent years U.S. MNEs have sought
to avoid the most burdensome aspect of those rules by merging with

8. A residual tax is the U.S. income tax liability that exceeds any allowable credit for
foreign income tax payments on foreign-source income.
9. See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Old Rules and New Realities:
Corporate Tax Policy in a Global Setting, 75 NAT’L TAX J. 937, 957 (2004); BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE & BUSINESS COUNCIL, POLICY BURDENS INHIBITING ECONOMIC
GROWTH 17–18 (June 21, 2010), available at http://businessroundtable.org/sites/
default/files/20100621_Letter_to_OMB_Director_Orszag_from_BRT_and_BC_with_Atta
chments.pdf; J.D. Foster & Curtis S. Dubay, Obama International Tax Plan Would
FOUND.
(May
5,
2009),
Weaken
Global
Competitiveness,
HERITAGE
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/05/Obama-International-Tax-PlanWould-Weaken-Global-Competitiveness; see also J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni
& Stephen E. Shay, Designing a U.S. Exemption System for Foreign Income When the
Treasury is Empty, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 397, 426–27 (2012) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni &
Shay, Designing] (arguing that if the U.S. international income system is reworked into an
exemption or territorial system, it should be designed to protect revenue); Daniel N.
Shaviro, Evaluating the Case for 1986-Style Corporate Tax Reform, 145 TAX NOTES 1267,
1274 (2014) (“[A]t present there is ‘no evidence’ to support assertions that U.S. companies
generally face higher effective tax rates, whether by reason of the higher statutory rate or
having a nominally worldwide system for taxing foreign source income.”).
10. See Eric Solomon, Corporate Inversions: A Symptom of Larger Tax System
Problems, 136 TAX NOTES 1449, 1449 (2012).
11. See I.R.C. § 7874 (2012); Martin A. Sullivan, Lessons from the Last War on
Inversions, 143 TAX NOTES 861, 861 (2014); Bret Wells, Corporate Inversions and Whacka-Mole Tax Policy, 143 TAX NOTES 1429, 1429–32 (2014) [hereinafter Wells, Whack-aMole].
12. See Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 TAX L. REV. 99,
160–61 (2011) [hereinafter Kleinbard, Lessons]; Lee A. Sheppard, Inversions Continue,
but Are More Difficult, 141 TAX NOTES 355, 355 (2013) [hereinafter Sheppard, Inversions
Continue].
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foreign corporations,13 and there has been considerable discussion
regarding the appropriate response.14
A major reason for U.S. MNEs to invert is to create large
amounts of debt owed to foreign related parties and then to erode the
U.S. income tax base by means of deductible interest payments on
that debt, a maneuver included under the rubric of earnings
stripping.15 We have argued for broadening the definition of U.S.
corporate tax residence, which would have a restraining effect on this
tactic.16 This argument, however, is not a complete response because
the untoward effects of earnings stripping, which we describe below,
are not dependent on the existence of an inverted corporation but

13. See DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
CORPORATE EXPATRIATION, INVERSIONS, AND MERGERS: TAX ISSUES 10–11 (2014);
Mindy Herzfeld, What’s Next in Inversion Land?, 143 TAX NOTES 1225, 1226–27 (2014);
Sheppard, Inversions Continue, supra note 12, at 355; Wells, Whack-a-Mole, supra note 11,
at 1432.
14. See U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS 37–38 (2015) [hereinafter
U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS]; Lindsey McPherson & Andrew Velarde,
Democrats Disagree on Legislative Fix for Inversions, 143 TAX NOTES 876, 876–77 (2014);
Stephen E. Shay, Mr. Secretary, Take the Tax Juice Out of Corporate Expatriations, 144
TAX NOTES 473, 479 (2014) [hereinafter Shay, Mr. Secretary]; Martin A. Sullivan, ShortTerm Inversion Fix May Be Necessary, 143 TAX NOTES 1090, 1092 (2014); Andrew
Velarde & Lindsey McPherson, Schumer Seeks Interest Deduction Limit for Inverters, 144
TAX NOTES 379, 379–80 (2014).
15. See U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, EARNINGS STRIPPING, TRANSFER PRICING AND U.S.
INCOME TAX TREATIES 21–22 (2007) [hereinafter U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, EARNINGS
STRIPPING]; Dana Mattioli, Acquirers Plot Escape from a Turn on Taxes, WALL ST. J.,
July 7, 2014, at C1, C2 (quoting Kevin Rinker, a partner at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, as
saying, “Because the [tax] benefit the buyer will get from an inversion is so important to a
deal, if there were a change in [tax] law, the original price wouldn’t make sense for the
acquirer”). As stated by Willard Taylor:
Inversions are not, and never were, solely about voting-with-your feet, or electing
into, an exemption system of taxation for foreign business income. . . . A dollar
earned in the United States is taxed at a 35% rate but if paid as interest to the new
Irish parent is taxed at a 12.5% rate at most (and is not subject to withholding
under the U.S.-Ireland Treaty). This has little to do with whether or not the
United States adopts an exemption or territorial system . . . .
Willard B. Taylor, Letter to the Editor, A Comment on Eric Solomon’s Article on
Corporate Inversions, 137 TAX NOTES 105, 105 (2012). This Article only addresses
earnings stripping in a cross-border context. Earnings stripping techniques also may be
used in connection with tax-exempt taxpayers, taxpayers with carryover losses, and in
other contexts, each of which would require separate technical and policy analyses that are
beyond the scope of this Article.
16. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Formulary
Apportionment in the U.S. International Income Tax System: Putting Lipstick on a Pig?, 36
MICH. J. INT’L LAW 1, 7 (2014) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Formulary
Apportionment]; Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Perspectives, supra note 3, at 1098–1100.
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also arise in the context of foreign-controlled MNEs that were not
formed by inverting a U.S. MNE. Consequently, this Article will
focus on developing an analytical framework for identifying responses
to the principal earnings stripping strategies, regardless of whether a
corporate inversion is involved.
C.

Illustrating the Earnings Stripping Challenge to Source Taxation

Foreign corporations that are not subsidiaries of U.S.
corporations pay U.S. income tax only on their U.S.-source income
(with a few limited exceptions).17 Thus, with respect to these
corporations, the principal revenue challenge is to ensure that their
U.S.-source income is, in fact, taxed by the United States rather than
being shifted out of the U.S. tax base by a variety of techniques,18
including the strategy known as earnings stripping. Example 1
illustrates this point.

17. See I.R.C. §§ 11(d), 881(a), 882(a), 864(c) (2012). Foreign corporations are subject
to U.S. income tax on certain specified items of foreign-source income that are effectively
connected with a trade or business conducted within the United States. See id.
§§ 864(c)(4), 882(a). As discussed in the text, a U.S. MNE parent of a foreign corporation
that is a controlled foreign corporation is taxed currently on most interest, dividends, and
royalties stripped from the United States under the foreign personal holding company
rules of Subpart F of the Code. See id. §§ 951–52, 954, 957–58. Under the Foreign Account
Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”) rules, certain nonparticipating foreign financial
institutions and nonfinancial foreign entities that fail to comply with specified reporting
obligations will be subject to withholding on withholdable payments without regard to the
technical geographical source of the income. See id. §§ 1471–1474.
18. Other strategies include aggressive transfer pricing, loss importation, and “double
dip” financing. These strategies have been targeted with mixed success by several Internal
Revenue Code provisions. See id. §§ 334(b)(1), 362(e)(1), 482, 1503(d). We do not
consider in this Article the effect on earnings stripping of structural reforms to the
corporate income tax. Recent proposals would (i) shift the corporate tax to shareholders,
see, e.g., ERIC TODER & ALAN D. VIARD, MAJOR SURGERY NEEDED: A CALL FOR
STRUCTURAL REFORM OF THE U.S. CORPORATE INCOME TAX 1 (2014) (report funded
by the Peter G. Peterson Foundation), available at http://www.aei.org/publication/majorsurgery-needed-a-call-for-structural-reform-of-the-us-corporate-income-tax/; (ii) convert
the corporate tax into a form of cash flow consumption tax, see, e.g., ALAN J. AUERBACH,
A MODERN CORPORATE TAX 9 (2010), available at http://www.hamiltonproject.org/
papers/a_modern_corporate_tax/; and (iii) adopt a cost of capital deduction and
shareholder inclusion in lieu of an interest deduction, see, e.g., EDWARD D. KLEINBARD,
REHABILITATING THE BUSINESS INCOME TAX 5 (2007), available at
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/rehabilitating_the_business_income_tax1/. Each of
these proposals remains a work in progress and requires further specification before being
in a form capable of adoption as legislation. Consideration of whether earnings stripping
remedies would be necessary in the event of a structural reform of the corporate income
tax can wait until such a proposal has some serious prospect of being adopted.
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Example 1: USSub is a U.S. corporation and a wholly owned
subsidiary of UKCo, a U.K. corporation that manufactures
precision scientific instruments in the United Kingdom and
whose shares are predominantly owned by nonresidents of the
United States. UKCo sells the instruments to USSub, which
markets them to U.S. customers. To a substantial extent,
USSub’s operations are financed by loans from UKCo. These
loans satisfy existing U.S. income tax law criteria for treatment
as bona fide debt and they result in large market rate interest
payments by USSub to UKCo. USSub also makes large market
rate royalty payments to UKCo for the use of important
marketing intangibles pursuant to contract terms that qualify as
licenses rather than sales under U.S. income tax law. In
addition, UKCo receives substantial fees from USSub for
actually providing various accounting and management services
from its U.K. offices. Although the fees are set at fair market
value rates, they are substantially above UKCo’s actual cost of
furnishing the services. USSub’s interest payments, royalty
payments, and fees payments are all deductible expenses for
U.S. income tax purposes19 and have the effect of absorbing
most of USSub’s income even if no transfer pricing abuse is
involved, a tactic commonly referred to as “earnings stripping.”
Consequently, there is no U.S. income tax on most of USSub’s
profits from sales into the United States.20 Moreover, there is
no U.S. withholding tax on fees for UKCo’s management
19. See I.R.C. §§ 162(a), 163(a); see also J. COMM., CROSS-BORDER INCOME, supra
note 5, at 54 (“A domestic corporation with a foreign parent may reduce the U.S. tax on
the income derived from its U.S. operations through the payment of deductible amounts
such as interest, rents, royalties, premiums, and management services fees to the foreign
parent or other foreign affiliates that are not subject to U.S. tax on the receipt of such
payments. Generating excessively large U.S. tax deductions in this manner is known as
‘earnings stripping.’ ”); U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, EARNINGS STRIPPING, supra note 15, at 7
(“Although payments of other deductible amounts by a U.S. corporation to tax-exempt or
partially exempt related parties also provide an opportunity to shift income out of a U.S.
corporation, the use of related-party debt arguably is the most readily available method
for shifting income out of U.S. corporations.”); Taylor, supra note 15, at 106 (stating that
proposals to deal with earnings stripping “should not be limited to interest but should also
consider reinsurance premiums . . . and the treatment of payments to related foreign
persons for the use of intangible or other property and for off-shore services”). Note that
because USSub makes actual payments to UKCo, § 267(a)(3) does not prevent USSub
from deducting the interest payments. See Treas. Reg. § 1.267(a)-3(b)(4), ex.1 (1993).
20. UKCo has no U.S. taxable income from its sales to USSub because the sales are
not made through a U.S. permanent establishment. See Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income
and on Capital Gains, U.S.-U.K., arts. 5, 7, July 24, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 13,161 [hereinafter
U.S.-U.K. Treaty]. We assume for purposes of this discussion that UKCo is a “qualified
person” and is entitled to all of the benefits of the United States-United Kingdom Income
Tax Treaty. See id. at art. 23.
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services performed from its U.K. headquarters21 and the United
States-United Kingdom Income Tax Treaty makes the U.S.
withholding tax inapplicable to USSub’s interest and royalty
payments to UKCo.22
With respect to payments by U.S. MNEs to controlled foreign
corporations, the earnings stripping problem is mitigated by the
application of the Subpart F foreign personal holding company rules,
which, when they apply to the income from deductible U.S. payments,
bring the amounts back into the U.S. tax base.23 Avoiding the Subpart
F rules in order to engage in U.S. earnings stripping is an important
reason for corporate expatriations/inversions.24 This clear intersection
of residence and source taxation highlights a fundamental feature of
international taxation. Taxation at source plays a critical role in
protection of the residence tax base in that strong anti-earnings
stripping rules reduce the incentive for a U.S. corporation to
expatriate to become a foreign corporation.25 In turn, comprehensive
residence taxation of worldwide income protects against residents’
use of foreign corporations to erode the residence taxation base.
Without application of the Subpart F foreign personal holding
company rules, U.S. MNEs would engage in stripping the U.S. tax
base just as they are stripping foreign tax bases.26
21. See I.R.C. §§ 862(a)(3), 882(a) (2012).
22. See U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 20, at arts. 11, 12. U.S. income tax treaties
typically follow this pattern. See UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF
NOVEMBER 15, 2006, arts. 11, 12 [hereinafter 2006 U.S. MODEL], available at
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/model006.pdf.
23. I.R.C. § 954(a), (c); see CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, ROBERT J. PERONI &
RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 496 (4th
ed. 2011). For a detailed discussion of the Subpart F provisions of the Code, see 1 JOEL D.
KUNTZ & ROBERT J. PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION ch. B3 (1992 & Cum.
Supp. No. 3 2014).
24. See Shay, Mr. Secretary, supra note 14, at 474; Taylor, supra note 15, at 105.
25. Strong earnings stripping rules interfere with the tactic of a U.S. corporation
transforming itself into a foreign corporation with a U.S. subsidiary that makes deductible
payments of interest, services fees, and royalties to the foreign corporation that reduce the
subsidiary’s U.S. tax base. By limiting these deductible payments and protecting the U.S.
subsidiary’s U.S. tax base, properly designed earnings stripping rules reduce the tax
savings to be achieved in the corporate expatriation transaction.
26. See COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS: ANNUAL
REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2011–12, 2012–13, H.C. 716, ¶ 8, Ev 21–Ev 50 (U.K.)
(containing oral evidence taken from Troy Alstead, Starbucks Global Chief Financial
Officer; Andrew Cecil, Amazon Director of Public Policy; and Matt Brittin, Google Vice
President for Sales and Operations, Northern and Central Europe, on Nov. 12, 2012); Lee
A. Shepperd, Luxembourg Lubricates Income Stripping, 145 TAX NOTES 1071, 1071–72
(2014); Tom Bergin, Burger King Has Maneuvered to Cut U.S. Tax Bill for Years,
REUTERS (Sept. 2, 2014), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/09/02/uk-burger-king-taxinsight-idUKKBN0GX0AK20140902?feedType=RSS&feedName=GCA-GoogleNewsUK
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One important principle of tax system design is to not put
pressure on margins the tax system cannot defend—what might be
called weak margins.27 Three weak margins in the current
international tax rules are: corporate residence,28 attributing income
to a geographic source according to the legal category of the income,29
and applying an arm’s-length transfer pricing principle in contexts in
which there is not a reasonably close market benchmark.30 As we will
demonstrate, earnings stripping tax minimization strategies place
pressure on tax systems across each of these margins.31 Effective and

(reporting that Burger King had pre-tax losses in Germany for two years on over $500
million in sales after payments of 5% of the sales turnover to Swiss affiliate); Leslie
Wayne, Kelly Carr, Marina Walker Guevara, Mar Cabra & Michael Hudson, Leaked
Documents Expose Global Companies’ Secret Tax Deals in Luxembourg, INT’L
CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Nov. 5, 2014, 4:00 PM),
http://www.icij.org/project/luxembourg-leaks/leaked-documents-expose-global-companiessecret-tax-deals-luxembourg (disclosing Luxembourg tax rulings for U.S. and non-U.S.
MNE structures that shifted profits through earnings stripping and other tax-saving
maneuvers in Luxembourg that were authorized under the rulings).
27. In contrast to the tax system designer/tax policy analyst, the tax planner seeks out
weak margins in order to exploit them to avoid taxes. The idea of weak margins may be
attributed in part to Harry Grubert, who emphasizes aligning design of policy instruments
with the behavioral margins to be affected. See Harry Grubert, Tax Credits, Source Rules,
Trade, and Electronic Commerce: Behavioral Margins and the Design of International Tax
Systems, 58 TAX L. REV. 149, 150 (2005).
28. In other work, we have suggested directions for strengthening the definition of
corporate residence, see Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Formulary Apportionment, supra note
16, at 23, and one of us has very preliminarily explored how to reduce the significance of
corporate residence in the taxation of shareholders, see Stephen E. Shay, Theory,
Complications, and Policy: Daniel Shaviro’s Fixing U.S. International Taxation, 9
JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 104, 106 (2014). Other commentators have explored
alternative residence tests. See, e.g., Omri Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, 54
B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1618 (2013) (considering basing U.S. residency on U.S. public listing or
central management and control in the United States); George K. Yin, Letter to the
Editor, Stopping Corporate Inversions Sensibly and Legally, 144 TAX NOTES 1087, 1087
(2014) (suggesting that residence of an enterprise should be based on location of the
enterprise’s principal customer base).
29. See Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, The David
Tillinghast Lecture “What’s Source Got to Do with It?” Source Rules and U.S. International
Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81, 83 (2002) [hereinafter Shay, Fleming & Peroni, What’s
Source Got to Do with It?].
30. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Formulary Apportionment, supra note 16, at 3;
Stephen E. Shay, Commentary on Ownership Neutrality and Practical Complications, 62
TAX L. REV. 317, 327–30 (2009).
31. Earnings stripping is also a major target of the G20’s efforts to fight base erosion
and profit shifting, often referred to as the “BEPS project” or “BEPS plan.” See ORG. FOR
ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING
15–17 (2013) [hereinafter OECD, ACTION PLAN]; Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16
FLA. TAX REV. 55, 88–91 (2014); Kristin A. Parillo, Amanda Athanasiou, Margaret
Burow, Ajay Gupta, David D. Stewart & Stephanie Suong Johnston, OECD Releases
BEPS Report Ahead of G-20 Meeting, 144 TAX NOTES 1347, 1347 (2014).
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coherent limitations on earnings stripping should reduce that
pressure.
The earnings stripping problem shown in Example 1 would be
even more exigent if the United States adopted a so-called territorial
system. Such a system would typically employ characterization rules
and arm’s-length transfer pricing principles to identify foreign-source
business income of U.S. corporations and would then exclude such
income from the U.S. tax base.32 In that case, the business income tax
base for U.S. corporations would be a narrow construct limited to
U.S.-source business income.33 Erosion of this narrow base through
earnings stripping would have an even greater impact than if foreignsource business income of U.S. corporations were included in the
base under true worldwide taxation or, at a minimum, under more
robust Subpart F-type anti-avoidance rules. Thus, contrary to the
arguments made by some proponents of territorial taxation,34
adoption of a territorial system by the United States will not
ameliorate the earnings stripping problem and will probably make it
worse.35 Stated differently, earnings stripping is a discrete issue that
plagues both worldwide and territorial systems. Consequently, there
is no good reason that earnings stripping reforms should be deferred
until the United States determines whether its international income
tax regime will be comprehensively transformed into a territorial
system or a real worldwide system.36

32. See Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 12, at 138 (stating that “a territorial tax system
means in practice that every country, including the residence country, is just another
source country”).
33. See CBO, OPTIONS, supra note 5, at 3; see also Wells, Whack-a-Mole, supra note
11, at 1433 (“The U.S. subpart F regime has served as a means to backstop the U.S. tax
base when this skewed application of our transfer pricing and treaty rules creates
inappropriate profit-shifting opportunities.”).
34. See, e.g., William McBride, Letter to the Editor, Earnings Stripping and the
Complexity of the Corporate Tax, 144 TAX NOTES 1086, 1086 (2014); Scott A. Hodge, IRS
Data Contradicts Kleinbard’s Warning of Earnings Stripping Inversions, TAX POL’Y BLOG
(Sept. 2, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/irs-data-contradicts-Kleinbard-s-warningsearnings-stripping-inversions.
35. See Edward D. Kleinbard, “Competitiveness” Has Nothing to Do With It, 144 TAX
NOTES 1055, 1056 (2014); Paul Caron, The Tax Foundation and Ed Kleinbard Debate the
Impact of Inversions on the Corporate Tax Base, TAX POL’Y BLOG (Sept. 7, 2014),
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2014/09/tax-foundation.html (providing Kleinbard’s
response to criticisms raised by Hodge, supra note 34).
36. See Martin A. Sullivan, Will Tax Reform Stop Inversions?, 144 TAX NOTES 530,
531 (2014).
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D. Aggressive Transfer Pricing Is Not Necessary
The facts of Example 1 stipulated that USSub’s deductible
payments to UKCo were all at fair market value rates. Nevertheless,
the effect of those payments was to move a substantial portion of
USSub’s U.S.-source income out of the U.S. tax base and into the
low-tax United Kingdom.37 This fact illustrates the point that while
aggressive transfer pricing magnifies the base erosion effect of
earnings stripping (in some cases, greatly so), it is not a necessary
element of the earnings stripping strategy. Earnings stripping can be
effectively executed with arm’s-length payments.
Earnings stripping, in practice, however, is inextricably
intertwined with transfer pricing rules and tax minimization strategies
based on those rules. Under accepted interpretations of the arm’slength principle, a generous range of prices may be found to be
“arm’s length.”38 Accordingly, in determining what is an arm’s-length
payment for an item for which there is not a reliable comparable
transaction, well-advised taxpayers naturally will adopt a price that is
at whichever extreme end of the arm’s-length range that yields the
most favorable after-tax result. So long as that price is within an
arm’s-length range of prices, the current U.S. transfer pricing
regulations immunize the pricing from adjustment.39
There is a further and more intractable transfer pricing problem.
Transfer pricing rules, like source rules, operate on the basis of legal
categories.40 When payments are made for intangibles and services in
a related party context in which the overall enterprise earns economic
rents, it is possible to apply the transfer pricing rules either to transfer
a portion of the rents through higher royalties or services payments or
to leave the rents undisturbed in the income of the company that
nominally earned the rents. There is no separate legal category for
economic rents, except, to a limited extent, goodwill (the treatment of
which from a legal perspective is underdeveloped). Which country is
entitled to tax the rents is the central question of inter-nation income
allocation and earnings stripping transfer pricing strategies are a
flexible tool for taxpayers to use in making their own allocation of
economic rents. As will be seen below, the problem of which related
37. In 2015, the U.K. general corporate tax rate will be 20%. William McBride, Tax
Reform in the UK Reversed the Tide of Corporate Tax Inversions, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 14,
2014), http://taxfoundation.org/article/tax-reform-uk-reversed-tide-corporate-tax-inversions.
38. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(e) (as amended in 2013).
39. See id. § 1.482-1(e)(1).
40. See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 23, at 721–57; 1 KUNTZ & PERONI,
supra note 23, ¶ A3.01[1].
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party should obtain the benefits of economic rents is a confounding
issue in identifying a theoretically satisfying normative benchmark to
evaluate earnings stripping.
E.

A Corporate Inversion Is Not Essential

In Example 1, there are several ways by which USSub might
have become UKCo’s wholly owned subsidiary. USSub might have
been a subsidiary created by UKCo to carry on the latter’s U.S. sales
operation. Alternatively, UKCo and USSub might have been
historically unrelated parties that came into a parent-subsidiary
structure through a variety of methods. Generally, if UKCo is larger
than USSub, UKCo would acquire USSub in an arm’s-length
transaction. In the current market environment, if USSub is larger
than UKCo, USSub might engage in a so-called inversion transaction
in which a new UKCo parent corporation is organized with USSub
and old UKCo as subsidiaries. USSub would engage in U.S.
marketing activity for old UKCo.41 Example 1 does not specify which
of these paths the companies took to position USSub as a UKCo
subsidiary since that is irrelevant for purposes of this Article. The
critical point is that regardless of which transactional pattern was used
to bring about Example 1, a foreign-owned U.S. subsidiary, such as
USSub, was made available to serve as the facilitator of the earnings
stripping strategy illustrated in that example. A corollary to this point
is that restrictions on earnings stripping reduce both the incentive for
U.S. corporations to invert and the relative advantage for a foreign
corporation to acquire a U.S. corporation.
41. There are multiple forms of inversion transactions. For descriptions and
explanations, see MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 13, at 3–5; DAVID L. BRUMBAUGH,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31444, FIRMS THAT INCORPORATE ABROAD FOR TAX
PURPOSES: CORPORATE “INVERSIONS” AND “EXPATRIATION” 3–4 (2007); Steven H.
Goldman, Corporate Expatriation: A Case Analysis, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 71, 73, 74–76 (2008);
Solomon, supra note 10, at 1204–05; Steven M. Surdell, Inversions 2014—Self Help
International Tax Reform for U.S. Multinationals?, 92 TAXES 63, 64–80 (2014); Bret Wells,
Cant and the Inconvenient Truth About Corporate Inversions, 136 TAX NOTES 429, 430–36
(2012) [hereinafter Wells, Inconvenient Truth]; Bret Wells, What Corporate Inversions
Teach About International Tax Reform, 127 TAX NOTES 1345, 1349–51 (2010) [hereinafter
Wells, Corporate Inversions].
There is a large body of literature discussing corporate inversions and the
legislative and administrative attempts to deal with them. See, e.g., BRUMBAUGH, supra,
at 6, 9–14; Solomon, supra note 10, at 1206–10; Wells, Inconvenient Truth, supra, at 430–
36; Wells, Corporate Inversions, supra, at 1349–51. Because this Article focuses on the
earnings stripping problem, which does not require a corporate inversion, see generally J.
COMM., CROSS-BORDER INCOME, supra note 5, at 50; U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, EARNINGS
STRIPPING, supra note 15, at 9–10; Taylor, supra note 15, at 105, we do not discuss this
literature or the details of the corporate inversion topic.
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What’s Bad About Earnings Stripping?

The preceding discussion leads to the question of exactly why
earnings stripping is an apt object of tax policy concern. A major
objection to earnings stripping is that it depletes the U.S. tax base.42
This is shown in Example 1 where the U.S.-source income of the
UKCo-USSub MNE was the only portion of that MNE’s worldwide
income that was potentially taxable by the United States. Yet
earnings stripping removed most of that income from the reach of the
U.S. income tax even though the MNE generated the income by
exploiting the U.S. market.43
A second objection to earnings stripping arises from the
preceding point. U.S. resident corporations that compete with UKCo
in the U.S. market, but that are not subsidiaries of foreign
corporations, cannot generate income that escapes U.S. taxation
through earnings stripping. This is so because they have no foreign
parent to which they can make deductible payments.44 Thus, these
independent U.S. resident corporations find themselves at a tax-based
disadvantage in the U.S. market vis-à-vis the UKCo-USSub MNE.45
The result of this competitive disadvantage is an incentive for
foreign corporations to create or acquire U.S. corporations, or for
42. See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, EARNINGS STRIPPING, supra note 15, at 21–23.
43. The 2007 U.S. Treasury report on earnings stripping stated that “[t]he effect of
earnings stripping on the U.S. tax base is unclear, because we cannot accurately quantify
earnings stripping by [foreign controlled domestic corporations] generally.” Id. at 26.
Examining a data set of companies that inverted before 2004, the report found clear
evidence of earnings stripping of U.S. affiliates of foreign companies that inverted. Id. at
21. The fact that the effect of earnings stripping could not be precisely quantified does not,
however, mean that the effect is insignificant. The OECD has concluded that the effect of
earnings stripping on the tax bases of member countries is, indeed, significant. See OECD,
ACTION PLAN, supra note 31, at 16–17. An important item in the BEPS action plan is Item
11 (“Establish methodologies to collect and analyze data on BEPS and the actions to
address it.”), which should lead to improvements in the empirical data on these issues. See
id. at 21–22. See generally Edoardo Traversa, Interest Deductibility and the BEPS Action
Plan: nihil novi sub sole?, 2013 BRIT. TAX REV. 607 (2013) (critiquing the portion of the
Action Plan that deals with intra-group interest payments).
44. If a U.S. subsidiary makes deductible interest, royalty, and fees payments to a U.S.
parent corporation, the deductions are removed from the subsidiary’s taxable income, but
they remain in the U.S. tax base as income items of the parent corporation. See I.R.C. § 61
(2012). If a U.S. corporation makes deductible interest, royalty, and fees payments to a
foreign subsidiary of a U.S. parent corporation, the payments are likely to be included in
the U.S. tax base as Subpart F income that is currently taxable to the U.S. parent
corporation as a constructive inclusion. See id. §§ 951–952, 954, 957–958.
45. See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, EARNINGS STRIPPING, supra note 15, at 23, 26; see also
OECD, ACTION PLAN, supra note 31, at 8 (“[C]orporations that operate only in domestic
markets, including family-owned businesses or new innovative companies, have difficulty
competing with MNEs that have the ability to shift their profits across borders to avoid or
reduce tax.”).
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U.S. corporations to create foreign parent corporations to invert their
corporate structure, so that the earnings stripping advantage can be
achieved.46 We see no reason for the United States to provide a
revenue-losing tax incentive for these corporate formations or
acquisitions.47
G. Tax Competition
To the extent that the earnings stripping limitations in § 163(j)
are avoided or inapplicable for the reasons discussed later in this
Article,48 the earnings stripping illustrated in Example 1 allows the
foreign investor, UKCo, to earn U.S. business income (i.e., earn
income in the U.S. market) without paying U.S. income tax. This is
clearly an incentive for UKCo and other foreign corporations to
invest in U.S. business activity. So might an indulgent U.S. attitude
towards earnings stripping attract large amounts of foreign
investment that would produce a prodigious U.S. business expansion?
Would this, in turn, yield domestic economic benefits sufficient to
more than pay for the Treasury’s revenue loss resulting from a zero
U.S. tax on the stripped income? A full answer to these questions
would require a separate article that reviews the extensive literature
regarding whether tax competition does or does not produce
sufficient benefits to warrant low or zero tax rates. This literature is,
at best, mixed regarding the effects of tax competition.49 Moreover,
46. See Wells, Whack-a-Mole, supra note 11, at 1432.
47. See generally Kimberly A. Clausing, Should Tax Policy Target Multinational Firm
Headquarters?, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 741, 761 (2010) (discussing several disadvantages to these
types of tax incentives).
48. The significantly limited coverage of § 163(j) and the substantial avoidance
opportunities that result are discussed infra Part III.B.
49. Indeed, in many cases it will be unclear whether the optimal response to a tax rate
change by one country is for another country to increase or decrease its tax rate. As stated
by two commentators:
Intuition might suggest, in particular, that the best response to a reduction in some
other country’s tax rate will be for [country] i to reduce its own rate too; meaning
that tax rates are strategic complements. But this is not, in general, assured (even
in the case of symmetric countries). A lower tax rate in some other country j, for
instance, moves capital out of country i, and so reduces its tax revenue and public
spending; whether the best response to this is for i to raise or lower its tax rate
depends, among other things, on how large an increase in the marginal value of
public spending this implies (being more likely the greater is that increase).
Michael Keen & Kai Konrad, The Theory of International Tax Competition and
Coordination, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 258, 267–68 (2013). A cynic might
argue that if a country does not know the correct sign of the response, tax competition
either is truly stupid or is a consequence of capture by interested parties. See INT’L
MONETARY FUND, SPILLOVERS IN INT’L CORPORATE TAXATION 21–23 (2014)
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the investment capital that tax competition seeks to attract is already
abundantly available in the United States.50 Consequently, we will not
engage in a lengthy detour into the tax competition debate. For
present purposes, we will assume, we believe realistically, that the
Treasury’s revenue loss from earnings stripping will not yield a morethan-compensatory cornucopia of benefits.
The old-fashioned form of tax competition involved tax increases
in the form of tariffs instead of tax subsidies.51 In developing
appropriate constraints on earnings stripping we are mindful that we
do not want to turn to protectionism of U.S.-produced goods and
services. Defense of the U.S. income tax base is not in any way
protectionism, however. As shown above, it serves as a constraint on
both U.S. as well as foreign resident taxpayers. Moreover, unlike a
tariff that is imposed only on foreign producers, an income tax policy
directed at moving toward neutral taxation of U.S. and non-U.S.
controlled taxpayers should reduce, not increase, economic
distortions. Under the principles we develop below, normal market
returns are respected for foreign as well as U.S. business activity.
H. Does the United States Have a Normative Source Taxation Right?
The purpose of this Article is to explore ways to eliminate or
reduce the benefits of earnings stripping by the UKCo-USSub MNE
in Example 1 and similarly situated foreign enterprises that sell into
the U.S. market. This purpose assumes, of course, that the United
States has a normative right to tax the U.S.-source income of the
UKCo-USSub MNE. We have addressed that question in prior work
[hereinafter IMF, SPILLOVERS] (stating that alleged benefits of tax competition “generate
heated dispute, but remain essentially uninformed by empirical knowledge”); see also
Thushyanthan Baskaran & Mariana Lopes de Fonseca, The Economics and Empirics of
Tax Competition: A Survey and Lessons for the EU, 7 ERASMUS L. REV. 3, 3–12 (2014)
(surveying the economics literature on tax competition and concluding that it is ambiguous
regarding whether or not tax competition causes a race to the bottom).
50. This is evidenced at present by the very low U.S. interest rates reported regularly
in the financial press, see, e.g., Biggest 1,000 Stocks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2014, at C6; Ben
Edwards, Apple’s Euro Bond Sells at Record-Low Rate, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2014, at C8,
and by frequent financial press stories regarding the large cash accumulations of U.S.
corporations, see, e.g., Theo Francis & Ted Mann, An Irony of U.S. Policy: Record Cash,
Record Debt, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2014, at B1; Vipal Monga, New Rules, New Puzzle:
Where to Stash the Cash?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2014, at B1. These low interest rates also
facilitate funding of the federal budget deficit. If interest rates increase during a period of
continued U.S. budget deficits, the negative impact of the revenue loss would be
exacerbated.
51. See HARRY G. BRAINARD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY
93–103 (1954); Yariv Brauner, International Tax and Trade Agreements May Be
Coordinated, but Not Reconciled, 25 VA. TAX REV. 251, 253 (2005).
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and explained that the United States does, indeed, have such a right
based on a benefits rationale, on the right of a nation-state to
determine the conditions for access to its economy by nonresidents,
and on considerations of fairness to its own residents who compete in
the U.S. domestic economy against nonresidents.52 Moreover, the
right of a country to tax nonresidents on income earned within its
borders is well established as a principle of customary international
law.53 Thus, it is appropriate for the United States to address the
earnings stripping strategy illustrated in Example 1.
I.

Should the Focus Be Limited to Inversions and Interest
Payments?

As shown in Example 1, earnings stripping can take place
without being connected with a corporate inversion, and earnings
stripping can be accomplished by means of royalty and services fees
payments in addition to interest payments. Nevertheless, the 2007
Treasury report on earnings stripping seemed to endorse the view
that because (1) “the use of related-party debt arguably is the most
readily available method of shifting income out of U.S.
corporations,”54 (2) the “data on . . . [inverted corporations] strongly
suggests that these corporations are shifting substantially all of their
income out of the United States, primarily through interest

52. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, What’s Source Got to Do with It?, supra note 29, at
88–106. Professor Daniel Shaviro has argued that purely as a prudential matter, “zero is
likely to be the optimal U.S. tax rate for truly inbound investment earning a merely
normal rate of return which the [foreign] investors could and would match elsewhere.”
Shaviro, supra note 9, at 1273. This statement, however, assumes that the relevant foreign
countries tax their residents’ U.S.-source income at a positive rate without allowing an
adequate credit for U.S. income tax. See id. In reality, the major trading partners of the
United States generally address U.S.-source business income by either exempting it or
taxing it with a full foreign tax credit for U.S. tax, and they generally deal with U.S.-source
investment income by taxing it and allowing a full foreign tax credit for U.S. tax.
Moreover, Professor Shaviro’s quoted statement does not challenge the normative case for
U.S. taxation of U.S.-source income earned by foreign persons.
53. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 411–12 (1986); REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 27 (2007)
[hereinafter AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW]; Kim Brooks,
Global Distributive Justice: The Potential for a Feminist Analysis of International Tax
Revenue Allocation, 21 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 267, 280 (2009); Michael S. Kirsch, The Role
of Physical Presence in the Taxation of Cross-Border Personal Services, 51 B.C. L. REV.
993, 999 (2010). For a discussion of the connection between source-based taxation and the
international law concept of sovereignty, see Diane M. Ring, What’s at Stake in the
Sovereignty Debate?: International Tax and the Nation-State, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 155, 157–
233 (2008).
54. U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, EARNINGS STRIPPING, supra note 15, at 7.
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payments,”55 and (3) “the Treasury Department is unable to quantify
accurately the extent of earnings stripping [by U.S. subsidiaries
outside of the inversion setting],”56 earnings stripping reforms should
focus on interest deductions in the inversion scenario and action
regarding other payments and scenarios should be deferred until
further data is gathered.57
This view strikes us as unsatisfactory because the Treasury report
also recognized that deductible payments other than interest can be
used for earnings stripping58 and that “opportunities for earnings
stripping are not limited to inversion transactions . . . [but] are present
in cases where a U.S. business is structured from the outset with a
foreign parent and in cases where a foreign corporation acquires a
U.S. operating group.”59 Moreover, the aggressive behavior of
corporations in using other tactics to shift profits out of the U.S. tax
base60 ipso facto suggests that earnings stripping is surely being
employed for the same purpose in scenarios other than corporate
inversions even if the confirming data has not yet been collected.61

55. Id. at 21; see also Jim A. Seida & William F. Wempe, Effective Tax Rate Changes
and Earnings Stripping Following Corporate Inversion, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 805, 825 (2004)
(finding that “a typical inversion firm experiences an 11.6 percentage point reduction in its
effective tax rate . . . [and that a] large portion of the reduction is attributable to the
stripping of U.S. earnings via intercompany interest payments”).
56. U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, EARNINGS STRIPPING, supra note 15, at 26.
57. Id. at 29, 31.
58. Id. at 7.
59. Id. at 29; see also STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111ST CONG., PRESENT
LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATED TO POSSIBLE INCOME SHIFTING AND TRANSFER
PRICING, JCX-37-2010, at 108–09 (Comm. Print 2010) [hereinafter JOINT COMM., INCOME
SHIFTING AND TRANSFER PRICING].
60. See Harry Grubert, Foreign Taxes and the Growing Share of Multinational
Company Income Abroad: Profits, Not Sales, Are Being Globalized, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 247,
274 (2012); Martin A. Sullivan, Pfizer’s Tax Picture Dominated by U.S. Losses,
Repatriation, 140 TAX NOTES 103, 105–10 (2013); Martin A. Sullivan, Transfer Pricing
Abuse Is Job-Killing Corporate Welfare, 128 TAX NOTES 461, 461 (2010); Martin A.
Sullivan, U.S. Multinationals Paying Less Foreign Tax, 118 TAX NOTES 1177, 1177–83
(2008); Martin A. Sullivan, U.S. Multinationals Shifting Profits Out of the United States,
118 TAX NOTES 1078, 1078 (2008); see also U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, EARNINGS STRIPPING,
supra note 15, at 55–61; Transfer Pricing Issues: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways &
Means, 111th Cong. 1–6 (2010) (statement of Stephen E. Shay, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Int’l Tax Affairs, U.S. Treasury Dep’t) (updating data reported in 2007 study and
finding substantial income shifting to lower-tax countries, including evidence from
company tax data of margin increases correlated inversely with effective tax rates).
61. We agree with the following analysis by the Staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation:
[S]ome argue that, as a matter of tax policy, the earnings stripping rules should be
strengthened for all foreign-controlled domestic corporations (including
expatriated entities) because they all have the same incentives and capabilities to
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The recent ScottishPower62 case is illustrative. ScottishPower
PLC structured its 1999 acquisition of PacifiCorp for $6.5 billion (and
assumption of debt) to insert $4.896 billion of fixed and floating rate
intra-MNE debt into the U.S. acquisition entity (resulting in
approximately a 3:1 debt to equity ratio).63 The Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”) lost its challenge to the deduction of $932 million of
interest paid over three tax years, 2001 to 2003.64 As another example,
in 2009, the IRS withdrew its challenge to the deduction of interest
paid on $13.5 billion of intra-MNE debt between GlaxoSmithKline
Holdings (Americas) Inc. and a Swiss affiliate.65 Neither of these
cases involved inversions and many more examples could be
adduced.66 Consequently, we conclude that consideration of earnings
stripping reforms should not be limited to interest payments that are
connected with corporate inversions. Moreover, consideration should
be given to protecting the U.S. tax base from other types of earnings
stripping deductible payments (such as royalties and services fees)
made to both related parties and tax indifferent third parties.67
Reform, however, requires identification of an underlying policy
and that policy cannot be ascertained until a theoretical baseline is
established. Part II deals with that matter.

erode the U.S. tax base, and may do so in the same manner. . . . Proponents of
stricter across-the-board earnings stripping rules also argue that there is sufficient
evidence of earnings stripping to justify implementing such a regime, and that
significant erosion of the U.S. tax base will continue until earnings stripping rules
are strengthened for all foreign-controlled domestic corporations.
J. COMM., CROSS-BORDER INCOME, supra note 5, at 61.
62. NA Gen. P’ship & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1916 (2012).
63. See id. at 1917.
64. See id. at 1919, 1924.
65. See Stipulation, GlaxoSmithKline Holdings (Americas) Inc. v. Comm’r., Nos.
18940-08, 18941-08 (T.C. Nov. 19, 2009).
66. For example, reportedly, 20% to 30% of all large cases open at the end of 2012
involved a debt-equity classification issue. Andrew Velarde, Recent IRS Litigation Presents
Opportunities for Taxpayers in Debt-Equity Cases, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 15, 2013,
available at LEXIS, 2013 TNT 221-4.
67. See, e.g., Sven-Olof Lodin, Intragroup Royalties As a Vehicle for International Tax
Arbitrage, 71 TAX NOTES INT’L 1317, 1318 (2013) [hereinafter Lodin II] (“Most countries
have introduced limitations of the total interest cost deductible. . . . This reduction of the
room for using interest payments for income shifting has meant that other income-shifting
methods are expected to be used more frequently. Royalty payments have become the
fastest-growing substitute method for profit shifting.”); Taylor, supra note 15, at 106
(“ ‘Earnings stripping’ in this context should not be limited to interest but should also
consider reinsurance premiums . . . and the treatment of payments to related foreign
persons for the use of intangible or other property and for off-shore services.”).

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 673 (2015)

2015]

CROSS-BORDER EARNINGS STRIPPING

693

II. ESTABLISHING THE POLICY BASELINE
A. The Need for a Policy Baseline
The principal U.S. tool for restraining cross-border earnings
stripping is § 163(j) of the Code. This provision, in highly simplified
terms, limits a U.S. corporation’s current deduction for interest
payments to related parties if the U.S. withholding tax rate on the
payments is subject to a treaty reduction and if the U.S. corporation
has a year-end debt-to-equity ratio greater than 1.5 to 1.68 However,
the deduction limitation applies only to the excess of the
corporation’s net interest expense over 50% of its adjusted taxable
income (i.e., taxable income calculated without taking net interest
expense and certain other items into account),69 and the amount
disallowed is carried forward to later taxable years.70 Section 163(j)
does not affect corporations that can either keep their aggregate debt
within the 1.5 to 1 ratio or keep their net interest expense below 50%
of adjusted taxable income.71 Moreover, importantly, § 163(j) does
not apply to other deductible payments, including royalties and
services fees, made by a U.S. corporation to a related party.72 In
addition, it is difficult to discern any coherent theory underlying
§ 163(j) tests for determining when to allow a deduction for interest
paid to related parties. Thus, § 163(j), in its current form, is both
under-theorized and not very effective in restraining earnings
stripping. Although § 163(j) also applies to interest paid to taxexempt organizations,73 our focus is on the theoretical basis to combat
cross-border earnings stripping.
68. See I.R.C. § 163(j)(1)-(3) (2012).
69. A body of case law allows the IRS to re-characterize nominal corporate debt as an
equity investment and to deny any deduction for interest payments on such debt. See, e.g.,
Philip G. Cohen, Testing for Thin Capitalization Under Section 163(j): A Flawed Safe
Harbor, 67 TAX LAW. 67, 77–81 (2013); David C. Garlock & Amin N. Khalaf, Debt vs.
Equity: Myths, Best Practices and Practical Considerations for U.S. Tax Aspects of RelatedParty Financings, TAXES, Aug. 2014, at 35, 36–49; William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal
Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L.
REV. 369, 370 (1971). However, when the formalities of debt are observed between the
parties, this case law has allowed highly leveraged debtor corporations to deduct interest
on related party debt. See Baker Commodities, Inc. v. Comm’r, 48 T.C. 374, 401 (1967)
(upholding debtor corporation’s interest deductions in spite of 700:1 debt-equity ratio),
aff’d, 415 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 988 (1970). This case law has not
been effective in restraining earnings stripping. See generally NA Gen. P’ship &
Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 103 T.C.M 1916 (2012).
70. See I.R.C. § 163(j)(1)(B).
71. See id. § 163(j)(1), (2)(A)–(B).
72. See id. § 163(j)(1)(A).
73. See id. § 163(j)(3)(A).
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For those concerned about earnings stripping, a seemingly
obvious reform strategy might be to make § 163(j) less generous by
extending it to royalty and services fees payments made to foreign
related parties and by tightening the 50% of adjusted taxable income
and 1.5 to 1 debt to equity benchmarks. We will examine those
possibilities in Part III.B of this Article. Before we can do that,
however, we must first deal with certain difficult foundational
questions. What is the normative basis for limiting earnings stripping
deductions? Should the limitations be less generous than current
§ 163(j), and to what extent? What is the correct degree of limitation
on deductions for payments to related foreign parties? To answer
those questions, it will be helpful to establish a policy baseline and
develop a theoretically coherent approach for restraining earnings
stripping. The remainder of Part II addresses that topic.74
B.

The No Deduction for Costless Payments Principle

Example 2 provides a useful place to begin by considering
unrelated party financing.
Example 2: USCo, a U.S. corporation, borrows at a 10% per
annum interest charge from an unrelated foreign bank and
invests the proceeds in a U.S. business activity that yields a 10%
annual return. Obviously, this produces an economic wash; the
interest charge on the loan exactly equals the investment
return, which means that there is no gain or loss because the
interest charge is a cost of pursuing USCo’s business activity
that must be taken into account to properly measure USCo’s
economic result. Therefore, a tax deduction must be allowed
for the interest charge so that USCo’s tax result will reflect
economic reality. The same point applies to royalty payments
and services payments that USCo makes to unrelated parties.
These conclusions are based on the fact that the U.S. income
tax is a levy on net income.75 Thus, when business-connected
interest payments,76 royalty payments, and services payments
74. The general background rule of the Internal Revenue Code is that capital
expenditures are not currently deductible unless an exception applies. See id. § 263(a)(1);
JOSEPH M. DODGE, J. CLIFTON FLEMING, JR. & ROBERT J. PERONI, FEDERAL INCOME
TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND POLICY 43–48 (4th ed. 2012). Thus, in the remainder
of this Article, all expenditures identified as deductible are assumed to be current
expenses and not capital expenditures.
75. See I.R.C. § 63 (defining taxable income as net income). See generally id. § 1
(using the taxable income of individuals to determine tax levy due); id. § 11(a) (using the
taxable income of corporations to determine tax levy due).
76. See H. David Rosenbloom, Banes of an Income Tax: Legal Fictions, Elections,
Hypothetical Determinations and Related-Party Debt, 32 TAX NOTES INT’L 989, 997–98
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are made to independent payees, they should be deducted for
income tax purposes because they are costs of earning income
and the income tax base cannot be properly measured unless
these costs are subtracted.
Now compare that fact scenario with Example 3 where a thirdparty lender is not involved.
Example 3: USSub is a wholly owned U.S. subsidiary of UKCo,
a U.K. corporation with no external debt. USSub borrows funds
representing retained earnings from UKCo at 10% and invests
the proceeds in a U.S. business activity that yields a 10% annual
return. In this situation, if a deduction were allowed, it would
disguise the fact that the MNE’s U.S. activity yielded a 10%
return that effectively has been internally allocated from
USSub to UKCo by means of interest payments that do not
reflect a real offsetting interest expense.77 Stated differently, the
interest payment is not an expense that produces an economic
wash in relation to the U.S. income tax base; it effectively is a
distribution of income within the UKCo-USSub MNE.
Considered this way, USSub should not be allowed to deduct its
interest payments to UKCo because they effectively are
distributions in respect of equity.
1. Real Expenses vs. Costless Foreign Related Party Payments
If UKCo borrowed from an independent party to obtain the
funds to loan to USSub in Example 3, then the interest paid to the
independent lender would be a real cost rather than an internal
(2003) (“[I]nterest is generally deductible in the unrelated party context because it is a
legitimate cost of the funds needed to operate a business.”); Jonathan Talisman, Do No
Harm: Keep Corporate Interest Fully Deductible, 141 TAX NOTES 211, 211–12 (2013)
[hereinafter Talisman, Do No Harm]. See generally AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME
TAX PROJECT: REPORTER’S STUDY DRAFT: SUBCHAPTER C (SUPPLEMENTAL STUDY)
80–83 (June 1, 1989) [hereinafter ALI, SUPPLEMENTAL STUDY] (explaining the need for a
corporate interest deduction with respect to unrelated party debt).
77. See IMF, SPILLOVERS, supra note 49, at 30 (explaining that intra-MNE interest
payments are a method for shifting profits to low-tax countries and concluding that “[i]t is
reasonable to ask why, in principle, any deduction at all should be given for interest paid
to related parties”). As stated by H. David Rosenbloom:
[R]elated-party debt [interest] is generally not compensation for money lent from
one person to another. Rather it is a transfer of funds from one incorporated
pocket to another. . . . As noted, interest is generally deductible in the unrelatedparty context because it is a legitimate cost of the funds needed to operate a
business. The application of this rationale in a related-party context, where no
funds are being raised, is one of the tax miracles of our time.
Rosenbloom, supra note 76, at 997–98; see also Johanna Hey, Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting and Interest Expenditure, 68 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 332, 342 (2014).
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distribution. Thus, to that extent, USSub’s interest payments to
UKCo would be reimbursements for a real cost. If the real cost is
attributable to U.S. business activity, which we assume at this stage of
the discussion, the reimbursed cost should be a deductible expense for
U.S. tax purposes in determining the U.S. taxable income of the
UKCo-USSub MNE.78 Likewise, USSub should be allowed to deduct
royalty payments to UKCo to the extent they reimburse UKCo for
the cost of developing its own intangibles or for the cost of acquiring
the use of unrelated party intangibles that UKCo sublicenses to
USSub and that USSub actually uses in its business. Finally, UKCo’s
actual labor costs incurred in providing management services from its
headquarters to USSub should also be deductible for U.S. tax
purposes, assuming that they benefit the U.S. business, because these
are real expenses rather than internal income distributions. These
conclusions do not, however, apply to amounts charged to USSub in
excess of UKCo’s actual intangible development and acquisition costs
and actual labor costs, without regard to whether the charges exceed
an arm’s-length amount.
One might protest that even if USSub’s payments to UKCo do
no more than reimburse UKCo for actual expenses incurred in
transactions with third parties for USSub’s benefit, they nevertheless
erode the U.S. tax base if they are treated as deductible. Speaking
generally, however, the U.S. tax base is not gross income; it is net
income (i.e., gross income minus the expenditures allowed as a
deduction).79 USSub’s reimbursement payments to UKCo are real
costs to the UKCo-USSub MNE of producing income through
activity in the United States. They are not costless transfers and their
deduction is essential for purposes of properly measuring USSub’s net
income. Stated differently, deductions for these payments measure,

78. To hold otherwise would force USSub to borrow directly from the third-party
lender and forgo the possibility that even if UKCo guaranteed USSub’s debts, UKCo
could borrow at a lower cost than USSub because of the nuances of applicable debtorcreditor law, UKCo’s greater size, and other factors. There is no apparent reason for the
income tax law to force subsidiaries like USSub into direct borrowing from third parties
when nontax market factors make it more efficient to have the borrowing done by a
foreign parent. As stated by Professor Kleinbard: “Capital markets ordinarily prefer
parent-level financing, because all of the group’s operations then support the loan, and
because the agency costs associated with policing parent-subsidiary transfer pricing and
transactions are irrelevant.” Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 12, at 163; see also Hey, supra
note 77, at 342. If, however, UKCo maintained a corresponding deposit with its lender,
UKCo’s real expense would be its net cost of borrowing. These and other avoidance
schemes will be considered in formulating workable implementing rules, discussed infra
Part III.
79. See I.R.C. §§ 1, 11, 63 (2012).
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but do not transfer, USSub’s net income and, therefore, these
deductions do not erode the U.S. income tax’s net income base. Thus,
allowing them to be deductible does not amount to tolerating base
erosion. To hold otherwise would lead to the conclusion that no
deduction should be allowed for any business expenses paid to
foreign unrelated parties in arm’s-length transactions. This would
amount to an economically indefensible definition of the tax base and
could have a deleterious effect on free trade.80
But, to recapitulate, up to this point our analysis suggests that (i)
interest charges paid by USSub to UKCo for use of the latter’s own
capital, (ii) royalties that exceed the related development costs paid
by USSub to UKCo for use of the latter’s self-developed intangibles,
and (iii) services fees paid by USSub to UKCo that exceed UKCo’s
actual cost of providing those services are all internal income
distributions that should not generate U.S. income tax deductions for
purposes of properly measuring USSub’s net income because they do
not represent real costs.81 To reflect this point, we will use the terms
“costless foreign related party expenses” and “costless foreign related
party payments” throughout this Article as a short-hand reference to
items that merely shift income within an MNE. In contrast, we use the
terms “real expenses” and “real payments” in referring to outlays that
are not costless foreign related party expenses or costless foreign
related party payments.82
We will discuss several further points below. First, should UKCo
earn a normal return on its expenditures? Second, should UKCo earn
more than a normal return on its expenditures or otherwise receive
payments for costless foreign related party expenses? If economic
rents are earned by the UKCo-USSub MNE, when should they
appropriately be allocated away from USSub to UKCo (an internation income allocation question), and when is a deductible payment
the appropriate legal mechanism for the transfer of income?
80. See ALI, SUPPLEMENTAL STUDY, supra note 76, at 80–83.
81. This is also the approach generally taken with respect to payments between a
corporation’s branches and its headquarters. See AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX
PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION:
PROPOSALS ON UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS AND OF THE
FOREIGN INCOME OF UNITED STATES PERSONS 121 (1987) [hereinafter ALI,
INTERNATIONAL TAX PROPOSALS].
82. This is an expansion of an approach advocated by H. David Rosenbloom. See
Rosenbloom, supra note 76, at 999–1000 (“[I]n the context of an ostensible debt owed by
one such [related corporate] party to another, it strains credulity to say that ‘repayment
absolutely and in all events’ is envisioned or provided for. Two pieces of paper owned
ultimately by a single economic interest cannot do business together no matter what legal
sophists say.”).
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2. Combined Reporting vs. Separate Accounting
The foregoing conclusions assume that it is analytically correct to
treat UKCo and USSub as a single economic enterprise. This seems
indisputably so. The separate corporate existence of UKCo and
USSub for income tax purposes is a legal fiction maintained for
reasons of convenience83 that can be curtailed or eliminated when the
costs of the fiction outweigh the benefits.84 Such would be the case if
UKCo were permitted to remove income from the U.S. tax base
merely by creating documents between itself and USSub, a controlled
party that has no mind and will of its own.85 Moreover, UKCo and
83. See DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, DECODING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX 10–14 (2009)
(explaining the administrative advantages of collecting income tax from corporations
instead of from numerous shareholders); Charles I. Kingson, Can a Piece of Paper Earn
Billions?, 71 TAX NOTES INT’L 243, 243 (2013) (stating that a “corporation is essentially a
piece of legal paper”); Rosenbloom, supra note 76, at 992 (stating that “[b]ecause
corporations are a convenient mechanism for the collection of tax, the U.S. system
considers them income tax payers”); see also U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, INTEGRATION OF
THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 29
(1992) (stating that “tax is more likely to be collected if paid at the corporate level”).
84. See Rosenbloom, supra note 76, at 992 (“[T]here does not appear to be a
fundamental inconsistency between collecting tax from the corporation and according it
something less than full ‘person-hood’ equivalent to individuals.”); see also GEORGE K.
YIN & DAVID J. SHAKOW, AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: TAXATION
OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES—REPORTERS’ STUDY 13–15 (1999) (proposing a
mandatory system of conduit taxation that would include taxing the owners of closely held
corporations directly on their shares of corporate income regardless of whether the
income is actually distributed); ALVIN C. WARREN, JR., AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL
INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME
TAXES—REPORTER’S STUDY OF CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION 1 (1993)
(recommending that corporate income be subjected to a shareholder tax and that the
corporate income tax be converted into a withholding mechanism for the shareholder tax).
As stated by another commentator:
[T]here is no general principle under international public law that countries have
to simply accept the legal existence of a domestic or foreign corporate entity as a
“shield” against any look-through approach from either side. Domestic legislation
(including domestic legislation in the country of the parent company) decides
which entities are “transparent” for tax purposes and which are not. Secondly, it
cannot be denied that the shareholders of the parent company are the final
recipients of profits earned by a subsidiary, even if these profits are not yet
repatriated for the time being. Thus, it depends only on good policy reasons
whether a look-through approach should be adopted, e.g. in the context of an
integration system for individual and corporate income tax applied by the host
country or in the context of anti-deferral measures (CFC legislation) established
by the home country.
Wolfgang Schön, International Tax Coordination for a Second-Best World (Part I),
WORLD TAX J. Sept. 2009, at 67, 92 [hereinafter Schön, Part I].
85. See Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 709 (2011)
[hereinafter Kleinbard, Stateless Income] (describing as “fantastic” the notion that “a
wholly-owned subsidiary has a mind of its own with which to negotiate ‘arm’s-length’
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USSub are treated as a single enterprise with respect to financial
reporting of profits and losses,86 and formulary apportionment
systems with combined reporting would impose the same result.87 In
addition, if USSub were the parent and UKCo were the subsidiary,
the two corporations would be effectively treated as one for purposes
of the indirect foreign tax credit.88 Finally, treating UKCo and USSub
as a unit is consistent with the contemporary view that the corporate
members of an MNE constitute an integrated enterprise in which the
separate entity status of the members is a legal fiction with no
economic substance.89
contractual terms with its parent”). Of course, this depletion of the tax base is allowed in
the domestic sphere where the related payee is a tax-exempt organization or a loss
corporation. This, however, raises tax policy and tax theory issues outside the scope of this
Article.
86. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND
RELATING TO THE INTERACTION OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX RULES AND FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING RULES 31–32 (2012); Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Consolidating Foreign
Affiliates, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 143, 154–56 (2011).
87. See SOL PICCIOTTO, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, TOWARDS UNITARY TAXATION
TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS
10
(2012),
available
at
OF
www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Towards_Unitary_Taxation_1-1.pdf;
Rosanne
Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Formula Apportionment: Is It Better Than the Current System
and Are There Better Alternatives?, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 1145, 1145 (2010); Reuven S. AviYonah & Ilan Benshalom, Formulary Apportionment—Myths and Prospects, WORLD TAX
J., Oct. 2011, at 371, 380; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C.
Durst, Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary
Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 497, 508 (2009); Lorence L. Bravenec, Connecting the Dots
in U.S. International Taxation, 27 TAX NOTES INT’L 845, 848–49 (2002); Cummings, supra
note 86, at 148–49; Brian Lebowitz, Profit Sharing as a New World Order in International
Taxation, 52 TAX NOTES INT’L 585, 589–90 (2008); Julie Roin, Can the Income Tax Be
Saved? The Promises and Pitfalls of Adopting Worldwide Formulary Apportionment, 61
TAX L. REV. 169, 214 (2008); H. David Rosenbloom, Angels on a Pin: Arm’s Length in the
World, 38 TAX NOTES INT’L 523, 523 (2005); Lee A. Sheppard, Is Transfer Pricing Worth
Salvaging?, 136 TAX NOTES 467, 469 (2012).
88. See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 23, at 367–71.
89. See PICCIOTTO, supra note 87, at 10; DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 197 (2014); Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 87, at
501; Cummings, supra note 86, at 148–49; Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 85, at
709 (rejecting the view that “a multinational enterprise that exists as a global platform to
exploit a core set of intangible assets best is analogized to wholly independent actors
taking on limited and straightforward roles in a vertical chain of production or a horizontal
array of distribution of a product”); Rosenbloom, supra note 76, at 992 (“The economic
justification for regarding a [related] group of 10 corporations as 10 separate persons is
hardly compelling. There may well be nontax justifications for the creation of the group,
but it is not foreordained that tax laws should respect the results.”). See generally J.
COMM., INCOME SHIFTING AND TRANSFER PRICING, supra note 59, at 12–17 (describing
intercompany transactions and their income tax consequences); Barbara Angus, Tom
Neubig, Eric Solomon & Mark Weinberger, The U.S. International Tax System at a
Crossroads, 127 TAX NOTES 45, 50–53 (2010) (discussing the rise of global companies and
the increased importance of their interconnectivity).
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Those who object to treating UKCo and USSub as a combined
enterprise will point out that under the arm’s-length approach
embedded in U.S. transfer pricing law, and in our tax law generally,90
they are treated as separate entities whose contracts with each other
generally are respected for purposes of allocating income and costs.91
However, this aspect of U.S. international taxation exists primarily
because its defenders insist that it is the best practical solution to
international allocation problems and not because it has a sound
normative basis.92 Indeed, the treatment of parents and subsidiaries as
legally distinct entities for international income tax purposes, an
approach known as separate accounting, is widely and severely
criticized for being based on a legal formality (separate
incorporation) that has no economic substance and that exposes the
theoretical incompleteness of the arm’s-length transfer pricing
regime.93 That regime does not provide a normative basis for treating
UKCo and USSub as separate entities. Indeed, the case for treating
them as a single MNE appears unassailable.
3. Affirming Nondeductibility
This analysis seems to lead to the tentative conclusion that in
Example 1, the payments from USSub to UKCo should not be
deductible for U.S. income tax purposes to the extent they are
costless foreign-related party expenses. Instead, it would appear that
such expenses should be ignored and USSub’s deductions should be
limited to real expenses. Speaking more broadly, it would seem that
90. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b) (2013).
91. See Moline Props. v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 436, 438–39 (1943); see also, e.g., ORG. FOR
ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., GUIDANCE ON TRANSFER PRICING ASPECTS OF
INTANGIBLES 40–42 (2014) [hereinafter OECD, GUIDANCE ON INTANGIBLES] (“Legal
ownership and contractual relationships serve simply as reference points for identifying
and analysing controlled transactions relating to the intangible and determining the
appropriate remuneration to members of the controlled group with respect to the
transactions.”).
92. See, e.g., OECD, ACTION PLAN, supra note 31, at 14 (disfavoring formulary
apportionment as a replacement for the arm’s-length approach to transfer pricing because
“it is . . . unclear that the behavioral changes companies might adopt in response to the use
of a formula would lead to investment decisions that are more efficient and tax-neutral
than under a separate entity approach”); id. at 19–20 (arguing that “[i]n many instances,
the existing transfer pricing rules, based on the arm’s length principle, effectively and
efficiently allocate the income of multinationals among taxing jurisdictions” and “rather
than seeking to replace the current transfer pricing system, the best course is to directly
address the flaws in the current system”).
93. See SHAVIRO, supra note 89, at 39–40; Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Formulary
Apportionment, supra note 16, at 18–20; Rosenbloom, supra note 76, at 995–96. See
generally Stanley I. Langbein, The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm’s Length, 30 TAX
NOTES 625 (1986) (criticizing the arm’s-length standard).
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in principle there should be no U.S. deductions for earnings stripping
payments made to related foreign parties except to the extent the
payments represent real expense. This tentative conclusion will be
revisited in Part II.C., but, first, we will consider certain aspects of a
rule of complete nondeductibility.
4. Conflict with Existing Domestic Law and Treaties
Notwithstanding the theoretical analysis above, existing U.S.
federal income tax law does, in fact, treat even wholly owned
subsidiaries and their parent corporations as separate taxpayers and
generally regards payments between them as real.94 Thus, in Example
1, § 162 would allow USSub to deduct its royalty and services fees
payments and § 163 would allow USSub to deduct its interest
payments, regardless of whether they represent real costs under the
analysis of Example 1.95 Section 482 would limit all of those
deductions to arm’s-length amounts, but the Example 1 facts state
that this restriction would not affect USSub’s deductions because
none of its payments exceed the arm’s-length standard.96 Thus,
implementing the tentative conclusions regarding nondeductibility in
the preceding paragraphs of this Part II.B. would require a change to
current U.S. tax law.
This discussion also raises important questions regarding the
articles dealing with associated enterprises, interest, royalties, and
nondiscrimination in the typical U.S. bilateral income tax treaty.
Virtually all such treaties became effective after 1977.97 Thus, they are
based on either the currently applicable U.S. Model Income Tax
Treaty of 2006,98 or the earlier U.S. Models of 1996,99 1981,100 or
1977.101 The salient provisions addressing associated enterprises,
interest, royalties, and nondiscrimination are substantially identical in
94. See Moline Props., 319 U.S. at 438–39; Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C.
525, 525 (1989), aff’d, 933 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1991).
95. See, e.g., Estate of Paxton v. Comm’r, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 771, 771 (1982); Lausman
v. Comm’r, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1740, 1743 (1978).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 19–22.
97. See IRS, WITHHOLDING OF TAX ON NONRESIDENT ALIENS AND FOREIGN
ENTITIES: PUBLICATION 515, at 59–60 tbl.3 (2013).
98. 2006 U.S. MODEL, supra note 22.
99. See Daniel M. Berman, Covering the World: The Expanding U.S. Tax Treaty
Network, 74 TAXES 1064, 1071–83 (1996).
100. 1981 U.S. MODEL INCOME AND CAPITAL TAX CONVENTION [hereinafter 1981
U.S. MODEL].
101. 1977 U.S. MODEL INCOME AND CAPITAL TAX CONVENTION [hereinafter 1977
U.S. MODEL].
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all four of these U.S. Model versions.102 Consequently, the extent of
any conflict between currently effective U.S. income tax treaties and
rules disallowing deductions for payments of interest, royalties, and
services fees to foreign-related parties can conveniently focus on the
relevant language of the current U.S. Model Treaty.103
Articles 11 and 12 of the current U.S. Model provide that treatycreated withholding tax reductions with respect to interest and
royalties received by nonresidents are inapplicable to the extent that
the interest and royalties exceed arm’s-length amounts.104 These
disqualifications, however, are irrelevant to the earnings stripping
problem illustrated in Example 1 because the related party payments
of interest and royalties in that example involve only arm’s-length
amounts and Articles 11 and 12 do not apply to the fees for services in
that example.105 Moreover, these Articles do not address the issue of
whether deductions can be denied solely on the ground that expenses
are costless. Thus, these provisions of the U.S. Model can be
dismissed for purposes of this discussion. Nevertheless, this is not the
end of treaty questions.
Article 9 of the current U.S. Model allows treaty countries to
make profit adjustments between related parties to correct transfer
pricing abuses, including abuses involving interest, royalties, and
services fees. It then adds that when one treaty party makes such an
adjustment, “that other State shall make an appropriate adjustment
to the amount of the tax charged therein on those profits.”106 Does
this language carry the negative implication that if dealings between
related parties do not involve a transfer pricing abuse, there can be no
adjustments that would affect the tax liability of one of the related
parties, not even a denial of deductions for costless expenses?
Although nothing in the language of Article 9 can be fairly
interpreted to create such an implication, the U.S. Treasury
102. Compare 2006 U.S. MODEL, supra note 22, at arts. 9, 11, 12, 24, with Berman,
supra note 99, at 1075–77, 1081, 1981 U.S. MODEL, supra note 100, at arts. 9, 11, 12, 24,
and 1977 U.S. MODEL, supra note 101, at arts. 9, 11, 12, 24.
103. Indeed, in the treaties between the United States and Ireland and the United
States and the United Kingdom, two of the most attractive destinations for earnings
stripping payments, the salient provisions dealing with associated enterprises, interest,
royalties, and nondiscrimination are substantially identical to the corresponding provisions
in the current U.S. Model. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains,
U.S.-Ir., arts. 9, 11, 12, 25, July 28, 1997, 2141 U.N.T.S. 167; U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note
20, at arts. 9, 11, 12, 25.
104. See 2006 U.S. MODEL, supra note 22, at art. 11, para. 5, art. 12, para. 4.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 19–22.
106. 2006 U.S. MODEL, supra note 22, at art. 9, para. 2.
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Department’s Technical Explanation of the U.S. Model states with
respect to Article 9 that “[i]f the conditions of the transaction are
consistent with those that would be made between independent
persons, the income arising from that transaction should not be
subject to adjustment under this Article.”107 In our view, this quoted
statement does not impose a blanket prohibition against making
adjustments to arm’s-length transactions. The italicized language
indicates that the quotation applies only to adjustments based on the
authority of Article 9. It says nothing about denying deductions for
expenses on the ground that the expenses are costless. Thus, a
statutory rule that prohibits the deduction of costless expense
payments to foreign related parties would not, in our judgment,
conflict with Article 9 of the typical U.S. income tax treaty.
That conclusion brings us to the current U.S. Model’s Article
108
24, which is the nondiscrimination provision contained in U.S.
income tax treaties. The portions of Article 24 that are relevant to
adoption of a U.S. rule denying deductions for costless expense
payments by U.S. resident corporations to foreign related parties are
Paragraphs 24.1, 24.4, and 24.5.109 Paragraph 24.1 provides that
nationals of treaty partners (including corporations)110 shall not be
subjected to more burdensome taxation than U.S. nationals “in the
same circumstances.”111 Arguably, this has no impact on the
disallowance of deductions for costless expense payments by U.S.
corporations to foreign related parties because the disallowance
increases the U.S. tax liability of the U.S. corporation, not the U.S.
tax liability of the foreign related party. The counterargument would
be that the foreign related party may bear some of the incidence of
the increased tax on the U.S. corporation112 and that this should make
107. UNITED STATES MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION ACCOMPANYING THE
UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006, art. 9, para.
1 [hereinafter U.S. EXPLANATION], available at www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/treaties/Documents/TEMod006.pdf (emphasis added).
108. See 2006 U.S. MODEL, supra note 22, at art. 24.
109. In the U.S. context, Paragraph 24.2 applies only to permanent establishments
(unincorporated branches) operated in the United States by nonresidents. See U.S.
EXPLANATION, supra note 107, at art. 24, para. 2. Paragraph 24.3 applies only to
nonresidents who are individuals. See U.S. EXPLANATION, supra note 107, at art. 24, para.
3.
110. See 2006 U.S. MODEL, supra note 22, at art. 3, para. 1(j)(ii).
111. Id. at art. 24, para. 1.
112. Regarding the uncertain incidence of the corporate income tax, see U.S.
TREASURY DEP’T, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE
INCIDENCE OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX 2 (2007) (concluding that labor may bear a
substantial burden from the corporate tax); JANE G. GRAVELLE & THOMAS L.
HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34229, CORPORATE INCOME TAX REFORM:
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Paragraph 24.1 applicable.113 There is no authority directly on point
but the fact that Paragraph 24.4 deals explicitly with denial of
deductions suggests that the more general language of Paragraph 24.1
does not conflict with a domestic rule denying deductions for costless
expenses paid to foreign related parties by U.S. corporations.114
More importantly, if the United States were to adopt a rule
prohibiting deductions for costless expenses paid by U.S. corporations
to related foreign parties, but not to related domestic parties,
Paragraph 24.1 states that such a rule would not be a violation thereof
unless the foreign and domestic payees were “in the same
circumstances.”115 Regarding this point, the U.S. Model’s Technical
Explanation states that “if one person is taxable in a Contracting
State on worldwide income and the other is not, . . . distinctions in
treatment would be justified under paragraph [24.]1.”116 Since U.S.
resident payees of costless expenses are taxable by the United States
on their worldwide incomes but foreign payees of such expenses are
usually taxable by the United States only on U.S.-source income, it
would seem that a U.S. rule prohibiting deductions for costless
expense payments by U.S. corporations to foreign related parties but
not to U.S. related parties would not conflict with Paragraph 24.1 of
the standard U.S. bilateral income tax treaty.117 This conclusion is

ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 15–29 (Cong. Res. Serv. 2011) (concluding that most of the
corporate tax’s burden falls on capital).
113. See 2006 U.S. MODEL, supra note 22, at art. 24, para. 1.
114. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME
AND CAPITAL, COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE 24, PARAGRAPH 1 [hereinafter OECD,
COMMENTARY] (“Article [24] should not be unduly extended to cover so-called ‘indirect’
discrimination.”); Mary C. Bennett, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture—Nondiscrimination
in International Tax Law: A Concept in Search of a Principle, 59 TAX L. REV. 439, 468
(2006) (stating that in the few relevant cases, the “courts showed no willingness to look
behind the terms of the relevant law to determine whether its overwhelming practical
effect would be to disfavor members of the protected class”).
115. 2006 U.S. MODEL, supra note 22, at art. 24, para. 1.
116. U.S. EXPLANATION, supra note 107, at art. 24.
117. A U.S. rule prohibiting deductions of costless expense payments to foreign related
parties would be mainly applicable to payments by U.S. subsidiary corporations to
affiliated foreign corporations—the scenario illustrated in Example 1. With respect to that
situation, the following comment by a prominent international income tax law practitioner
is relevant:
In the case of corporations, Article 24(1) . . . has essentially no impact for U.S.
income tax purposes, because the dividing line between those corporations subject
to U.S. tax on their worldwide income and those not so subject is . . . whether the
corporation is incorporated under U.S. laws. Thus, a corporation that is not a U.S.
“national” is, virtually by definition, not “in the same circumstances” as a
corporation that is a U.S. national.

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 673 (2015)

2015]

CROSS-BORDER EARNINGS STRIPPING

705

supported by the fact that unless a related domestic payee is a taxexempt entity, deductible payments to domestic related payees
remain in the U.S. tax base while deductible payments to foreign
related payees that are not controlled foreign corporations are
excluded from the U.S. tax base.118
There is, however, more to discuss regarding Article 24.
Paragraph 24.5 states:
Enterprises of a Contracting State, the capital of which is
wholly or partly owned or controlled directly or indirectly, by
one or more residents of the other Contracting State, shall not
be subjected in the first-mentioned State to any taxation or any
requirement connected therewith that is more burdensome
than the taxation and connected requirements to which other
similar enterprises of the first-mentioned State are or may be
subjected.119
For purposes of this provision, the term “enterprises” has been
interpreted to include business activity carried on by a corporation.120
Thus, in Example 1, USSub is an enterprise of the United States
within the meaning of Paragraph 24.5. However, Paragraph 24.5 only
applies to domestic rules that discriminate on the basis of foreign
ownership.121 A U.S. provision that prohibits deductions for costless
expense payments made to foreign related parties, but not to U.S.
resident related parties, will be acceptable under Paragraph 24.5 so
long as it makes no distinction between U.S. payors that are U.S.owned and U.S. payors that are foreign-owned.122 This is precisely the
Bennett, supra note 114, at 446; see also OECD, COMMENTARY, supra note 114, at para.
17 (stating that “two companies that are not residents of the same state for purposes of the
Convention . . . are usually not in the same circumstances for purposes of paragraph
[24].1”); Philip F. Postlewaite & David S. Makarski, The A.L.I. Tax Treaty Study—A
Critique and a Modest Proposal, 52 TAX LAW. 731, 794 (1999) (“Non-residents are seldom
in the same circumstances as that of a resident because they are generally not subject to
tax on their worldwide income.”).
118. See infra note 146.
119. 2006 U.S. MODEL, supra note 22, at art. 24, para. 4.
120. In UnionBanCal Corp. v. Comm’r, 113 T. C. 309, 325–26 (1999), aff’d, 305 F.3d
976 (9th Cir. 2002), the courts treated the term “enterprises” in Paragraph 24(5) of the
United States-United Kingdom income tax treaty, which was virtually identical to
Paragraph 24.5 of the current U.S. Model, as including business corporations.
121. See Square D Co. & Subs. v. Comm’r, 438 F.3d 739, 748 (7th Cir. 2006), aff’g 118
T.C. 299 (2002) (stating that Paragraph 24.5 “hinges on the nationality of the related party
to whom the payment goes and does not fluctuate based on nationality of the ultimate
owner [of the payor]”).
122. See UnionBanCal Corp. v. Comm’r, 305 F.3d 976, 987 (2002) (stating that
“discrimination against foreign-owned subsidiaries is all that the nondiscrimination clause
at issue protected it against”).

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 673 (2015)

706

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

type of rule that is suggested by the analysis in this Part II.B., and,
therefore, there would be no conflict with Paragraph 24.5 of the
current U.S. Model.
The preceding analysis also leads to a solution for the problem
posed by Paragraph 24.4. This paragraph provides that arm’s-length
amounts of “interest, royalties, and other disbursements paid by a
resident of a Contracting State to a resident of the other Contracting
State shall, for the purpose of determining the taxable profits of the
first-mentioned resident, be deductible under the same conditions as
if they had been paid to a resident of the first-mentioned State.”123
Paragraph 24.4 does not provide an exception to this requirement for
cases where foreign and domestic payees are in different
circumstances.124 Therefore, a U.S. rule prohibiting deductions for
In Square D Co. & Subs., 438 F.3d 739, a U.S. resident subsidiary corporation
claimed 1991 and 1992 deductions under the accrual method of accounting for interest
then owed to its French parent corporation but not paid until 1995 and 1996. 438 F.3d at
740. Treas. Reg. § 1.267(a)-3 generally provides that interest owed to a foreign related
party cannot be deducted until actually paid. Relying on this regulation, the IRS
disallowed the U.S. subsidiary’s 1991 and 1992 deductions and asserted that they had to be
deferred until actual payment was made in 1995 and 1996. Id. The U.S. subsidiary
contended that the regulation violated the portion of the United States-France income tax
treaty that was substantially identical to Paragraph 24.5 of the current 2006 U.S. Model.
Id. at 743. The U.S. subsidiary’s argument was that because the deductions would have
been allowed in 1991 and 1992 if the parent corporation had been a U.S. resident, denial
of the deductions until 1995 and 1996 on account of the parent corporation being a French
resident amounted to more burdensome taxation on a French corporation’s U.S.
subsidiary in violation of the treaty. Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court and
upheld the validity of the regulation, even though it discriminated, because it did not
create the type of discrimination that was prohibited by Paragraph 24.5 of the U.S. Model.
Id. at 748. The pertinent portion of the Seventh Circuit opinion states that
[Prohibited] discrimination is absent here. The regulation requires that all interest
payments to a foreign related party must use the cash method of accounting
without regard to the nationality of the owner [of the payor]. The regulation does
not impose the cash method simply because of foreign ownership [of the payor],
which would be prohibited, but rather for payments to a foreign related party.
Even if a corporation were owned by a United States parent, it still appears all
interest payments to one of these foreign related parties would lead to the use of
the cash method. The requirement, therefore, hinges on the nationality of the
related party to whom the payment goes and does not fluctuate based on
nationality of the ultimate owner [of the payor]. It is merely fortuitous that, in this
case, the foreign related party to which the payment was made also happened to be
the owner. The regulation does not discriminate based on foreign ownership [of
the payor], and thus, does not violate the nondiscrimination clause.
Id. at 748 (emphasis added); see also Square D Co. & Subs., 118 T.C. at 313–15 (adopting
the Seventh Circuit’s decision).
123. 2006 U.S. MODEL, supra note 22, at art. 24, para. 4.
124. The Technical Explanation of the U.S, Model Treaty states, in the introductory
paragraphs of the explanation of Article 24, that there is an exception to Paragraph 24.4
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arm’s-length amounts of costless expense payments made to foreign
related parties, but not to U.S. resident related parties, would appear
to conflict with Paragraph 24.4.125 When Congress enacted § 163(j),
which limits a U.S. corporation’s current deductions for interest
payments made to related parties but nevertheless allows substantial
amounts of such interest to be deducted within the limitation,126
Congress argued that § 163(j) did not conflict with U.S. treaty
obligations.127 Two of its arguments, evidently made with Paragraph
24.4 in mind, were that § 163(j) is both a rule for identifying nonarm’s-length interest amounts and a thin capitalization rule for
detecting dividends disguised as interest payments,128 both types of
rules being free from conflict with Paragraph 24.4.129 Even if these
arguments are valid,130 however, they surely cannot be stretched far
enough to legitimate a rule that would deny deductions for arm’slength interest payments by adequately capitalized U.S. corporations
to foreign related parties but not to U.S. resident related parties.
Moreover, these arguments have no application to a rule that limits
deductions for other kinds of payments to foreign related parties but
not to the U.S. resident related parties.
Fortunately, these difficulties can be overcome by adopting a
U.S. rule that prohibits deductions for payments of costless expenses
to all related parties, both domestic and foreign. Under this approach,
payments to residents of treaty countries will be deductible “under
the same conditions as if they had been paid to a resident” of the
treaty partner country.131 This approach involves a broader deduction
prohibition than the rule that solved the challenge posed by
Paragraph 24.5. That rule was limited to costless payments made to
foreign related parties—an approach that does not work under
Paragraph 24.4.

where foreign and domestic payees are in dissimilar situations. However, that is a printing
error and the statement clearly is intended to refer to Paragraph 24.5. See U.S.
EXPLANATION, supra note 107, at art. 24.
125. See U.S. EXPLANATION, supra note 107, at art. 24, para. 4.
126. For an explanation of the loose constraint imposed by Section 163(j), see infra
Part III.B.
127. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-386, at 569 (1989).
128. See id.; AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL
ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION II—PROPOSALS ON UNITED STATES
INCOME TAX TREATIES 281 (1992) [hereinafter ALI, TREATY PROPOSALS].
129. Paragraph 24.4 does not apply to nondeductible dividends and is also inapplicable
to other payments to the extent that they are non-arm’s-length.
130. For prominent criticism of these arguments, see ALI, TREATY PROPOSALS, supra
note 128, at 281.
131. 2006 U.S. MODEL, supra note 22, at art. 24, para. 4.

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 673 (2015)

708

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

In summary, the potential for conflict between the U.S. bilateral
treaty network and a U.S. rule that prohibits deductions for costless
expense payments made to related foreign parties is most acute with
respect to Paragraph 24.4 of the current U.S. Model. The conflict,
however, can be eliminated with a rule that applies regardless of
whether the related party is U.S. or foreign.
5. Taxpayer and IRS Gains
A general rule of nondeductibility would have two desirable
collateral effects. First, the pressure on the debt/equity distinction
would be reduced because interest payments to related foreign
parents that did not represent real expenses would be treated the
same as dividends; they would be nondeductible. Thus, the taxpayer
planning costs and the IRS enforcement resources devoted to the
debt/equity distinction would be reduced, and the distortive incentive
to over-leverage U.S. subsidiaries would also be reduced.
Second, if all foreign related party payments by U.S.
corporations would be nondeductible, the importance of transfer
pricing enforcement with respect to outbound interest, royalty, and
services fees payments would be greatly lessened.132 Consequently,
the related taxpayer compliance and planning costs would be
reduced, and the IRS administrative resources presently used to
police this area of transfer pricing could be devoted to other
purposes. In a case where the MNE earns economic rents, however,
this approach would leave unresolved the issue of whether the rents
properly reside in the company where the income attributable to
rents is located under the MNE’s accounting methodology. We will
take up this question in the next Part.
C.

The Investment Location Primacy Principle

In spite of the strong case for treating all costless foreign related
party payments as nondeductible, there are countervailing
considerations as illustrated by Example 4.
1. Intangibles
Example 4: As in Example 1, USSub is the wholly owned U.S.
marketing subsidiary of UKCo, a U.K. corporation that has
incurred considerable costs in the United Kingdom to develop a
132. See IMF, SPILLOVERS, supra note 49, at 33–34 (suggesting limitations on
deductions for intra-MNE interest payments as a partial alternative to transfer pricing
enforcement based on the arm’s-length principle).
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marketing intangible that is licensed to USSub for use in its
U.S. marketing activities. To aid in clear analysis, we make the
simplifying assumption that 100% of USSub’s royalty payments
to UKCo equals both a source country market return on
UKCo’s cost investment in the intangible as well as an arm’slength amount. Because the intangible was developed in the
United Kingdom, there is a plausible argument for allowing
that country an exclusive right to tax the market return on the
development cost (which would include recovery of that
cost).133 That market return happens to be 100% of USSub’s
royalty payments to UKCo under the facts of this example. We
will refer to this as the Investment Location Primacy Principle.
It would allow USSub to fully deduct the royalty payments so
as to remove them from the U.S. tax base.
Professor Lawrence Lokken has, however, suggested a different
conclusion.134 In 1981, he published an article in which he argued that
for purposes of determining the source of a royalty payment, both the
country where the related intangible was created (the United
Kingdom in Example 4) and the country where the intangible is used
(the United States in Example 4), have legitimate source claims.135
Nevertheless, since he viewed split sourcing as impractical,136 he
concluded that the royalty payment should be sourced entirely to the
country of use because that country’s legal protections make
exploitation of the related intangible possible and, therefore, give that
country the stronger source claim.137
Although Professor Lokken’s analysis was developed for
purposes of applying the U.S. rules for taxing U.S.-source income of
nonresident aliens and foreign corporations,138 it is relevant by
analogy to the inter-nation allocation of the income represented by
royalty payments received by a foreign parent corporation from a

133. See AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 53,
at 44–45; Lawrence Lokken, The Sources of Income from International Uses and
Dispositions of Intellectual Property, 36 TAX L. REV. 233, 241–42 (1981); Shay, Fleming &
Peroni, What’s Source Got to Do with It?, supra note 29, at 143.
134. See Lokken, supra note 133, at 241–43.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 242 (“[A] typical royalty cannot feasibly be split between the place of the
licensee’s use of the licensed property and the place of the activities by which the licensor
created the property.”); see also Wolfgang Schön, International Tax Coordination for a
Second-Best World (Part II), WORLD TAX J., Feb. 2010, at 65, 91 [hereinafter Schön, Part
II].
137. See Lokken, supra note 133, at 242–43 (“Overall, the country in which a licensee
uses intellectual property therefore has the strongest claim of origin.”).
138. See I.R.C. §§ 864, 871, 881, 882 (2012).
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U.S. subsidiary. If his analysis were applied to Example 4,139 it would
reach the opposite of our conclusion in that it would give the United
States the primary taxing claim with respect to the income
represented by USSub’s royalty payments. That would mean that the
payments would be nondeductible by USSub. The royalty payments
would be characterized for U.S. tax purposes as distributions with
respect to UKCo’s USSub stock, and the United Kingdom would
have the obligation to relieve double taxation.140
We respectfully disagree with this approach. At this point, our
discussion is purely theoretical, and if USSub pays a royalty to UKCo
in Example 4 that is limited to a normal market return on UKCo’s
U.K. creation cost, it seems to us that, in theory, this royalty
represents a return on the U.K. development work that should be
allocated exclusively to the U.K. tax base141 to the extent that it does

139. Professor Lokken did not, however, argue for this extension of his analysis. See
Lokken, supra note 133, at 241–43.
140. Professor Lokken addressed the operation of the U.S. rules for taxing the U.S.source income of nonresident aliens and foreign corporations. He did not expressly deal
with the inter-nation allocation of corporate profits or the consequences of denying
deductions when computing corporate net income (i.e., profits). However, his analysis can
be fairly understood as suggesting the outcome stated in the text. See Lokken, supra note
133, at 241–43.
141. See Schön, Part II, supra note 136, at 92–93.
Economists generally hold that the development of many intangible property
items (excluding logos, brand names, and the like) creates uncontrollable spillover effects
that can be enjoyed without cost by free riders. As a result, developers are said to be
unable to capture the full benefit of their costs and so have a tendency to underinvest in
creating this type of property. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 1 (2007). A frequent prescription for solving this
problem is a tax incentive for research and development. See, e.g., id.; Robert D.
Atkinson, The Case for the Research Tax Credit, 142 TAX NOTES 1226, 1226–27 (2014);
Martin A. Sullivan, Time to Scrap the Research Credit, 126 TAX NOTES 891, 891 (2010). In
this Article, we take no position on this matter. We do note, however, that if a tax
incentive is proper, the country where development occurs seems to be the appropriate
governmental authority to provide the incentive. This point is not specifically applicable to
the marketing intangible that is featured in Example 4 because that type of intangible is
unlikely to create uncontrollable spillover benefits.
Additionally, assigning USSub’s royalty payments to the U.K.’s taxing jurisdiction
as a return on UKCo’s development costs is consistent with the view that intangible
income should be allocated to the countries where value creation occurs. See OECD,
ACTION PLAN, supra note 31, at 18, 20.
Professor Adam Rosenzweig has recommended the adoption of rules that would
allocate intangible income to lesser developed countries to assist them in providing public
goods to their residents. See Adam H. Rosenzweig, Building a Framework for a PostBEPS World, 74 TAX NOTES INT’L 1077, 1080–81 (2014). This raises broader questions
about proposals for delivering foreign aid through the tax system. As explained in our
earlier work, if the tax system is to be used to deliver economic assistance to needy
countries, the best approach is to employ bilaterally negotiated arrangements rather than
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not exceed an arm’s-length amount.142 In contrast, income resulting
from using UKCo’s intangible to exploit the U.S. market is
appropriately allocated to, and should be taxed by, the United States.
In fact, that income is included in the profits of USSub that are
taxable by the United States after deductions are allowed for USSub’s
royalty payments to UKCo.143 Thus, in our view, the royalty should be
deductible by USSub, up to the lesser of a normal market return on
UKCo’s creation cost or an arm’s-length amount, and the deductible
amount should be taxed exclusively by the United Kingdom.144
However, if the United States applies the No Deduction for
Costless Payments Principle developed in Part II.B., USSub will not
be allowed to deduct the part of its royalty payments to UKCo in
Example 4 that exceeds a recovery of UKCo’s development cost. This
is so because the excess payments are simply costless transfers within
an MNE.145 Under that approach, the nondeductible portion of the

generally applicable statutory rules. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness, supra note 7, at
344–49.
142. In general, a normal market return on UKCo’s creation cost would be an arm’slength royalty. If, however, market dynamics cause a difference to occur, we believe that a
nuanced application of the arm’s-length benchmark such as that under development by
the OECD should be the standard for allocating income between related parties. See
OECD, GUIDANCE ON INTANGIBLES, supra note 91, at 40–42.
143. Professor Schön has demonstrated that in a complex intangible licensing situation,
up to four different countries may have plausible taxing claims with respect to income
generated by the intangible in question. See Schön, Part II, supra note 136, at 92. In such a
case, a more nuanced approach to international income allocation will be required than
the one examined in this Article. However, we believe that the simple binary allocation
issue that we have discussed is adequate to demonstrate that the Investment Location
Primacy Principle requires careful analysis and that the country where the intangible is put
to use can satisfy its taxing claim even while allowing a deduction for the related royalty
payment.
144. Not only do deductions serve to define the net income tax base, they also shift
income when coupled with a linked income inclusion that is imposed on another taxpayer.
A prominent example in U.S. federal income tax law is § 215, which defines an alimony
payor’s tax base by allowing a deduction for alimony payments, but which also shifts
income from the alimony payor to the alimony payee because of the linked income
inclusion imposed on the payee by § 71. Similarly, the allowance of U.S. deductions for
USSub’s royalty payments shifts income to the U.K. tax base by leaving the United
Kingdom with the exclusive right to tax those payments.
If UKCo had acquired the intangible by license or purchase, then the royalty
would be a return on UKCo’s investment in the intangible. In this scenario, however,
UKCo would not have engaged in any U.K. development activity, and USSub’s royalty
payments to UKCo would be entirely the result of exploiting the U.S. market. Thus, the
Investment Location Primacy Principle would not require that an income shifting
deduction be allowed for the royalty payments.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 78–82. We acknowledge the sometimes
difficult practical issues of identifying which costs relate to development of an intangible
and how to allocate the costs of unsuccessful research, but these issues are well known and
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royalty payments will effectively be included in the U.S. tax base (the
opposite of our conclusion just stated above) instead of being
allocated exclusively to the U.K. tax base. In contrast, if USSub were
allowed to fully deduct its royalty payments to UKCo, the deduction
would eliminate the payments from the U.S. tax base, and they would
be exclusively in the U.K. tax base.146 This is the correct result if one
accepts the argument that the United Kingdom has the primary
taxing right on all returns to the cost of developing the intangible in
the United Kingdom. Obviously, in Example 4, there is a conflict
between the No Deduction for Costless Payments Principle outlined
in Part II.B. and the Investment Location Primacy Principle. We will
address that conflict below.147
Before doing so, however, we must point out that our argument
for assigning royalties to the development country is subject to
qualifications. First, our argument that the Investment Location
Primacy Principle supports a taxing right on the part of the
development country would not justify an income allocation to the
development country greater than the lesser of a normal return on the
development cost or an arm’s-length amount.148 Thus, in Example 4,
the Investment Location Primacy Principle would allow USSub to
deduct only royalty payments that do not exceed that benchmark.
Payments in excess of that ceiling are costless intra-MNE
transfers and, therefore, should be nondeductible by USSub for U.S.
income tax purposes. Under this approach, supranormal returns, i.e.,
economic rents, would be taxable by the United States. It is not clear,
however, that this is the correct approach. In the context of a
particular intangible, economic rent exists because an exuberant
consumer preference allows the supplier to charge a price in excess of
what is justified by any possible objective superiority of the related
good or service. The necessary consumer reaction to the intangible is
a consequence of both development work (suggesting allocation to

regularly addressed in a variety of contexts. Moreover, our proposal to allow a normal
return on costs subsumes these issues. See infra text accompanying notes 148 and 159.
146. To illustrate the after-tax effects of these two scenarios, assume that USSub pays a
$100 royalty payment to UKCo. Also assume that USSub’s marginal U.S. income tax rate
is 35%. If the United States does not allow a deduction for the royalty payment, the
payment will come from funds bearing a 35% U.S. tax. Thus, the after-tax cost to USSub
of the $100 payment would be $154 ($154 × [1-.35] = $100). In contrast, if the United
States does allow a deduction for USSub’s royalty payment to UKCo, the deduction will
shelter the payment from U.S. tax so that only $100 of cash would be required to make the
royalty payment.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 190–98.
148. See supra notes 141–42.
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the development country) and consumer mindset (suggesting
allocation to the market country). Thus, allocating rent from
intangibles between development and market countries is an issue for
which there is no easy answer. Supranormal returns or rents are the
key point of intersection of earnings stripping and transfer pricing.
Our approach to earnings stripping would isolate this critical issue
and force taxpayers and tax authorities to identify returns that exceed
normal levels and develop explicit methods for dividing these returns
for taxation purposes.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to reach final conclusions on
the important and difficult issue of how to allocate economic rents,
i.e., residual profits, of an MNE; however, this is not a new problem.
We have explained in other work why we disfavor formulary
apportionment as a method for allocating the entire taxable income
from a business.149 There, we favored use of a residual profit split
method and also accepted that there is room for use of factors as a
basis on which to allocate income in particular circumstances.150 The
allocation of economic rents is such a circumstance.
The allocation of residual profit also underlies the methodology
of the OECD’s authorized approach under Article 7 of the OECD
Model Convention.151 That method emphasizes taking into account
the functions performed by, and the assets and risks borne in, each
country.152 Consistent with our analysis of costless payments within an
MNE, we are highly skeptical of risk shifting within an MNE. Thus,
we would focus on real functions performed by actual employees
using real assets. Before formulating our concrete conclusion
regarding the difficult problem of allocating rents, however, we look
forward to learning the outcome of the rethinking of these issues in
connection with the OECD BEPS project.153 We hope that this
Article will be helpful to that project.
Our analysis calls for the application of transfer pricing rules to
determine the portion of royalty payments that does not exceed the
normal return/arm’s-length ceiling and the excess portion. Although
the transfer pricing law on this point is not always precise, our

149. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Formulary Apportionment, supra note 16, at 56–57.
150. See id. at 158.
151. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV., MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND
CAPITAL, art. 7 (2010) [hereinafter OECD, MODEL CONVENTION].
152. See id. at art. 7, para. 2.
153. See OECD, ACTION PLAN, supra note 31, at 19–20; OECD, GUIDANCE ON
INTANGIBLES, supra note 91, at 9–12 (proposing revisions to OECD transfer pricing
guidelines on intangibles); Brauner, supra note 31, at 86–103.
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restriction of an allowable royalty deduction to a normal return on an
expenditure greatly simplifies this aspect of the calculation.
Moreover, we have explained in other work how these methods can
be made less vulnerable to taxpayer gaming by allowing the IRS to
make retrospective adjustments.154
Finally, it should be noted that the most extensive erosion of the
U.S. tax base by means of deductible royalty payments is not
accomplished by foreign owners of U.S. subsidiaries who use royalty
expense deductions to shift income out of the United States.155
Instead, the most extensive degradation of the U.S. tax base results
from U.S. MNEs moving their intangibles to tax-haven corporations
in countries where royalties are subject to little or no foreign tax,
remain unrepatriated for long periods of time, and then can be
sheltered from U.S. taxation by cross-crediting.156 In other words, it is
regrettable that transfer pricing law appears to be the principal tool
for limiting earnings stripping through deductible royalties, but that is
the lesser portion of the problem of the U.S. tax base being eroded by
transfers of intangibles returns. In addition, as we have often
observed, a significant part of the overall problem would be
substantially curtailed by U.S. adoption of real worldwide taxation.157
There is a second qualification to the argument that the
Investment Location Primacy Principle gives the country where an
intangible was developed an exclusive right to tax the lesser of a
normal market return on the development costs or an arm’s-length
royalty. It is that, as a practical matter, this principle can be applied
only if the ultimate licensor of the intangible is subject to the taxing
jurisdiction of the development country, as is the case in Example 4.158
Although the foregoing analysis has identified limitations to the
Investment Location Primacy Principle, it has left a substantial core
of that principle intact with respect to intangibles. That is, the country
where an intangible is developed should have a primary right to tax

154. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Formulary Apportionment, supra note 16, at 55.
155. See generally Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 12 (explaining how U.S. MNEs move
royalty income to low-tax foreign countries); Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 85
(same).
156. See generally Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 12, at 124–29 (explaining how U.S.
MNEs use cross-crediting to shelter royalties from U.S. taxation); Kleinbard, Stateless
Income, supra note 85, at 727–50 (same).
157. See, e.g., Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Perspectives, supra note 3, at 1081; Peroni,
Fleming, & Shay, Getting Serious, supra note 3, at 468–70, 497–501, 507–16.
158. The development country generally cannot tax income paid from a second
country to a recipient that is located in a third country and that is not otherwise subject to
the development country’s taxing jurisdiction.
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foreign-source intangibles royalties received by a licensor that is
subject to its taxing jurisdiction but only to the extent that the
royalties do not exceed the lesser of a normal market return on the
licensor’s development costs (which includes recovery of those costs)
or an arm’s-length amount.159 Thus, in Example 4, USSub should get a
U.S. deduction for its royalty payments that are not greater than that
benchmark. The deduction will shift the deducted amount out of the
U.S. tax base and make it exclusively subject to taxation by the
United Kingdom. In addition, royalties paid by USSub that effectively
reimburse UKCo for its costs of acquiring the use of unrelated party
intangibles that it has sublicensed to USSub are real costs to USSub
rather than costless intra-MNE transfers. Therefore, USSub should
be allowed to deduct such payments.
2. Relevance of a Foreign Tax
What if the USSub royalty payments that we have just argued
should be deductible for U.S. tax purposes are not taxed by the
United Kingdom, are taxed by the United Kingdom at a rate that is
much lower than the U.S. rate, or are paid through the United
Kingdom as a conduit to an affiliate in a low-tax country? To the
extent that USSub’s deductions are allowed in order to either
properly allocate income to the U.K.’s taxing jurisdiction or to
recognize real costs borne by UKCo for the benefit of USSub, it may
be argued that U.S. tax deductions should be allowed regardless of
the extent to which a U.K. tax is imposed on UKCo’s receipt of the
royalties.
We have argued in earlier work that income should not be
treated as foreign-source for purposes of applying a territorial
system160 unless the income bears a substantial foreign tax.161 That is
because the purpose of the exemption for foreign-source income
under a territorial system is to mitigate double taxation that would
otherwise chill international trade and investment.162 However,
application of the U.S. income tax to foreign-source income cannot
cause double taxation unless that income bears a significant foreign
tax.163 For that reason, we have argued that an exemption for foreign
income should not be available if the United States were to adopt a

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See supra text accompanying notes 147–58.
See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Designing, supra note 9, at 413–15.
See id.
See id. at 401–03.
See id. at 413–15.
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territorial system unless the relevant foreign-source income is subject
to a meaningful foreign tax.164
Double taxation is not, however, the issue regarding the
deductible royalties paid by USSub to UKCo in Example 4. There the
objective is to (i) allocate income representing a normal return to the
appropriate country or (ii) to take account of real costs borne by
USSub that must be recognized in order to properly measure
USSub’s U.S.-source net income. In that context, U.S. deductions for
USSub’s royalty payments should be allowed to the extent that
UKCo has borne real third-party costs for the benefit of USSub,
regardless of the U.K.’s tax treatment of those payments. Allocating
“normal return” income, however, is an issue of inter-nation revenue
allocation and not measurement of income.165 Thus, it is necessary to
determine whether source rules and transfer pricing rules are
sufficiently robust that they should be relied upon to allocate even
normal returns between countries in the absence of a meaningful
foreign tax on the income.166
As observed above, attributing income to a geographic source
according to the legal category of income is a “weak margin.”167 That
is, it is not a strong basis on which to determine important tax
consequences because source of income does not rest on a strong
normative basis and, in a range of cases, is susceptible to
manipulation.168 The Investment Location Primacy Principle can be
relied upon to identify which entity should earn income with respect
to a third-party cost, but, if there is no such third-party cost, the
“investment location” is a function of non-arm’s-length arrangements
among related parties and their dependent agents.169 It is, thus,
possible to inappropriately manipulate the investment location. A
subject-to-tax test adds a level of adversity with which to test the
reality of the claimed investment location. Without the friction of a
meaningful foreign tax, normal returns may be artificially shifted and

164. See id.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 133–44.
166. For purposes of this discussion, we are continuing to assume that the payments are
arm’s length. If that assumption is relaxed, the case for requiring a meaningful foreign tax
as a condition to allowing the deduction becomes stronger.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 27–31.
168. See Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 85, at 750–52; Shay, Fleming & Peroni,
What’s Source Got to Do with It?, supra note 29, at 137–38.
169. In other words, related corporations can agree among themselves to have
intangibles inappropriately considered to be developed in a low-tax country because the
work done and the risks assumed in the low-tax country are overstated.
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the source country denied revenue that is taxed nowhere or, if at all,
at a low rate.
It is internationally recognized that the source country is entitled
to tax income arising within its borders and owned by foreign
investors.170 As a matter of inter-nation equity, this principle permits
the source country to derive its share of revenue from the foreignowned capital in its country.171 Moreover, because of the “weak
margin” concerns, the source country should be allowed to assert its
claim to revenue by denying deductions if the investment location
country does not tax the income.172 In other words, we would allow
inter-nation revenue allocation concerns to take precedence over the
Investment Location Primary Principle in circumstances where the
normal return would not be subject to a meaningful foreign tax. We
next consider how to apply this approach in the context of hybrid
mismatches and taxation under another country’s controlled foreign
company rules.
Hybrid mismatches present a situation of current concern where
the existence, or not, of a foreign tax liability is relevant. From the
U.S. standpoint, a hybrid mismatch is presented when (1) a payment
from a U.S. taxpayer to a foreign resident bears no U.S. tax because
the payment is deductible for U.S. purposes and (2) the payment also
escapes foreign tax because it is excludable from the foreign payee’s
income under the applicable foreign tax regime.173 The result of this
asymmetry is income that is taxed nowhere, also referred to as
“double non-taxed income,” “homeless income,” and “stateless
income.”174
Hybrid mismatches that are relevant to U.S. earnings stripping
concerns can arise when a U.S. corporation issues a financial
instrument that is treated by the U.S. tax system as debt producing
deductible interest payments but that is characterized by the foreign
holder’s residence country as an equity investment yielding exempt

170. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Designing, supra note 9, at 401.
171. See Peggy B. Musgrave, Sovereignty, Entitlement, and Cooperation in International
Taxation, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1335, 1341–42 (2001).
172. In this situation, the lack of taxation by the investment location country
substantially increases the likelihood that the investment location is artificial and arranged
for tax-avoidance reasons.
173. See Michael L. Schler, OECD vs. D/NI: Ending Mismatches on Hybrid
Instruments, Part I, 75 TAX NOTES INT’L 485, 488–89 (2014); OECD, ACTION PLAN, supra
note 31, at 15–16.
174. See Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 85, at 701–02; Bret Wells & Cym
Lowell, Tax Base Erosion and Homeless Income: Collection at Source Is the Linchpin, 65
TAX L. REV. 535, 538 n.10 (2012) [hereinafter Wells & Lowell, Tax Base Erosion].
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dividend income.175 Obviously, the U.S.-source income that funds the
U.S.-deductible interest payments is not taxed in either the United
States or the holder’s residence country.
Hybrid mismatches can also be created by the use of so-called
hybrid entities—i.e., business organizations that are treated as
taxpayers in one country but disregarded as such in another
country.176 In the U.S. earnings stripping context, this scenario arises
when a U.S. corporation pays a business expense to a foreign
organization that is recognized as a corporate entity under U.S. law
but that is ignored by the foreign country and treated there as an
unincorporated branch of the U.S. payor.177 In such a case, the
payment bears no U.S. tax because it is deductible under U.S. law and
it bears no foreign tax because the foreign jurisdiction regards the
payment as a meaningless internal cash transfer from one part of the
U.S. corporation to another component of the same corporation.178
The problem with these results is that they yield income that is
taxed nowhere. Thus, U.S. taxpayers have a distortive incentive to
inefficiently pursue this income in lieu of taxable alternatives that are
economically superior from a before-tax perspective.
The significance of this hybrid mismatch issue and the full range
of appropriate responses are matters that are outside the scope of this
Article.179 For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that the Obama
Administration has proposed legislation that, generally speaking,
would deny deductions to U.S. taxpayers for interest and royalty
payments if the involvement of a hybrid instrument or a hybrid entity
resulted in no income inclusion by the foreign related payee under the
relevant foreign tax regime.180 The OECD is engaged in considering a
similar proposal.181
These proposals would be consistent with our analysis that the
source country should be permitted to tax income that otherwise
would be subject to double non-taxation by reason of these structured
175. See generally Lee A. Sheppard, BEPS Effects Without Implementation, 142 TAX
NOTES 775 (2014) (explaining the use of debt/equity hybrid instruments).
176. See OECD, ACTION PLAN, supra note 31, at 15–16; J. COMM., INCOME SHIFTING
AND TRANSFER PRICING, supra note 59, at 48.
177. See generally David D. Stewart, OECD Drafts Call for Domestic Law Solutions to
Hybrid Mismatches, 142 TAX NOTES 1315 (2014) (explaining OECD concerns regarding
hybrid entities).
178. Id.
179. For discussions of this issue, see generally id. (explaining the hybrid mismatch
problem); Amanda Athanasiou, Hybrid Mismatch Proposals: Practical Problems Remain,
74 TAX NOTES INT’L 1083 (2014) (same).
180. See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 14, at 10.
181. See OECD, ACTION PLAN, supra note 31, at 15–16.
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arrangements. They are consistent with our view that USSub’s
deductions have a normative basis when representing a real cost that
must be taken into account to properly measure net income. In
contrast, there is no normative basis for determining when a business
organization should be treated as a separate taxpayer that can receive
deductible payments and when it should be treated as an integral
component of its economic owner so that payments to it by the owner
are disregarded.182 Likewise, there is no normative guide for
determining whether an investor should be treated as a creditor or an
equity holder.183 These decisions are based primarily on
considerations such as the relative convenience of collecting a tax
from a single source (the business organization) instead of from
multiple sources (the owners) and judgments about what kinds of
investor rights and priorities are necessary to allow borrowers to
adequately raise capital.184 When making such prudential decisions, it
is appropriate to weigh the policy and revenue costs that result from
permitting the creation of double non-taxed income. When the costs
are too high, denying deductions for payments is an appropriate
response.
When considering the effect of disqualifying non-taxation, an
important practical question is whether indirect taxation under
controlled foreign company rules should be treated as taxation for
purposes of a subject-to-tax test. This is an additional element in the
inter-nation allocation of income. The issue generally arises when a
payment is made to a company that is a brother-sister affiliate of a
common parent company. If the payment is not subject to a
meaningful tax in the hands of the company receiving the payment
but is included in the common parent company’s income and
subjected to tax under controlled foreign company rules applicable to
the parent company, should the source country allow the deduction?
In this circumstance, the conditions for the allocation of income to the
investment location should be considered satisfied even though the
tax is imposed by a third country on the common parent and not on
the income recipient. This position is consistent with our approach of
recognizing the single economic nature of the multinational business
enterprise. In that circumstance, we would allow a deduction so that
182. See Schön, Part I, supra note 84, at 92.
183. See generally Wolfgang Schön, The Distinct Equity of the Debt-Equity Distinction,
66 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 490 (Sept. 2012) [hereinafter Schön, Debt-Equity] (explaining
that financial instruments are distributed along a debt/equity continuum that lacks sharp
borders between debt and equity).
184. Id.
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income constituting a normal return may be taxed in the investment
location country. For this purpose, we are in essence treating the “rest
of the world” as a single country.
3. Fees and Interest
To what extent does the preceding analysis regarding intangibles
also apply to the interest and management fees that USSub pays to
UKCo in Example 1? It strikes us as appropriate to treat UKCo’s
wage payments to its headquarters employees who furnish services to
USSub as the equivalent of an investment with a U.K. location. Thus,
the United Kingdom should have the primary right to tax a normal
market return on that investment.185 This means that USSub should
be allowed a deduction for that return in addition to its deduction, as
explained in Part II.B.,186 for the portion of the fees that equal
UKCo’s actual labor cost. However, USSub’s deduction should not
exceed the sum of UKCo’s actual labor cost plus a normal markup on
that cost because nothing in excess of that sum can be characterized
as deductible under the Investment Location Primacy Principle.187
Presumably, the deductible sum is the same as an arm’s-length
amount. This means that transfer pricing law must carry the burden of
determining the market rate return that should be included in
USSub’s deduction.
The internal cash that UKCo lends to USSub in Example 1 is
also an investment, and UKCo can expect a return on that investment
in the form of interest at a market rate. USSub’s use of the borrowed
funds in the United States, however, produced that interest. Thus, the
United States has the primary taxing claim to that interest,188 and the
Investment Location Primacy Principle would not require that the
185. This is consistent with the widely applied principle that the source of services
income for taxing purposes is the place where the services are performed. See I.R.C.
§§ 861(a)(3), 862(a)(3) (2012); ALI, INTERNATIONAL TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 81, at
57; AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 53, at 45.
186. See supra Part II.B.1.
187. See supra Part II.C.1.
188. The UKCo retained earnings that were the source of the funds loaned to USSub
in Example 1 were themselves a return on some investment by UKCo. The proper tax
treatment of that investment return, however, was previously effected by the relevant
taxing authority. At that point, the retained earnings were simply cash or its financial
equivalent. When those after-tax retained earnings were loaned to USSub, the interest
thereon became an entirely new and different investment return and under the facts of
Example 1, it was earned in the United States. This conclusion is consistent with the
widely applied principle that the source of interest income is generally the debtor’s
residence country. See I.R.C. § 861(a)(1); ALI, INTERNATIONAL TAX PROPOSALS, supra
note 81, at 67; AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
53, at 43.
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United States give USSub a deduction for its interest payments to
UKCo.189 In other words, both the No Deduction for Costless
Payments Principle and the Investment Location Primacy Principle
support the conclusion that USSub’s interest expense in Example 1
should be nondeductible for U.S. tax purposes.
D. Which Principle Prevails in the Case of a Conflict?
In the immediately preceding discussion, the Investment
Location Primacy Principle and the No Deduction for Costless
Payments Principle gave identical answers regarding USSub’s interest
payments on loans made by UKCo out of retained earnings—namely,
no U.S. deduction by USSub. There is, however, a conflict between
these principles with respect to royalties and fees for headquarters
services. The No Deduction for Costless Payments Principle posits
that a U.S. subsidiary’s deductions for use of its foreign parent’s selfdeveloped intangibles should be limited to the parent’s actual
development costs. It also suggests that the subsidiary’s deduction for
the cost of services provided by the foreign parent should not exceed
the parent’s actual labor costs.190 In contrast, the Investment Location
Primacy Principle would allow a subsidiary to deduct royalty
189. See also Wolfgang Schön, International Taxation for a Second-Best World (Part
III), WORLD TAX J., Oct. 2010, at 227, 241 (2010) (interest payments on intra-group loans
that do not involve outside financing “should be subject to the same treatment as
dividends to controlling shareholders”).
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a)(1) provides that
[w]here one member of a group of controlled entities makes a loan or advance
directly or indirectly to . . . another member of such group and either charges no
interest, or charges interest at a rate which is not equal to an arm’s length rate of
interest . . . the district director may make appropriate allocations to reflect an
arm’s length rate of interest for the use of such loan or advance.
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a)(1) (2011). If this regulation is intended to reflect a U.S. decision
that the USSub-UKCo MNE is entitled to have the United States recognize a deductible
arm’s-length interest payment from USSub to UKCo in Example 1, we conclude that the
decision is wrong as a matter of sound policy. However, we believe that the words “may”
and “appropriate” in the preceding quotation mean that this regulation is not intended to
create such an entitlement. We believe that these words should be read to permit
disallowance of a USSub deduction for the interest paid to UKCo in Example 1. This view
is supported by the following language from Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(1) (2013): “The
purpose of section 482 is to ensure that taxpayers clearly reflect income . . . and to prevent
the avoidance of taxes,” and by the following language from Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(2):
“The district director may make allocations between or among the members of a
controlled group if a controlled taxpayer has not reported its true taxable income.” We
maintain that in Example 1, USCo’s true taxable income would not be reported if it were
allowed to deduct its interest payments because those payments do not represent a real
cost for reasons outlined in Part II of this Article.
190. See supra Part II.B.1.
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payments for use of its foreign parent’s self-developed intangibles up
to the lesser of a market return on the parent’s development costs or
an arm’s-length amount.191 It also would allow the subsidiary’s
deduction for services fees to be the sum of the parent’s actual labor
costs plus a normal market return thereon.192
Thus, the preceding conflict must be resolved. Article 9 of the
widely adopted OECD Model Income Tax Treaty states the
overarching principle and international norm that where related
corporations deal with each other, as in the case of USSub and UKCo
in Example 1, then their incomes from their dealings with each other
shall be calculated as if they had been independent parties dealing at
arm’s length.193 The purpose of the deductions that are allowed to
USSub under the Investment Location Primacy Principle is to give
the United Kingdom the same primary right to taxing jurisdiction that
it would have if UKCo were dealing with USSub at arm’s length and
insisting on a normal market rate of return with respect to the
services and intangible property provided by UKCo to USSub (after
application of the subject-to-tax limitation on the principle).194 The
Investment Location Primacy Principle is a form of jurisdiction-to-tax
rule whereas the No Deduction for Costless Payments Principle is a
base defining rule.195 Generally, jurisdictional rules should trump base
defining deduction disallowance rules.196 Consequently, we conclude
that the allowance of deductions under the Investment Location
Primacy Principle should trump a disallowance required by the No
Deduction for Costless Payments Principle. When, however, an
expense of USSub represents a real cost, a U.S. deduction should be
allowed even if the effect is to allocate income to another country.
Thus, interest paid by USSub to unrelated parties in Example 2
should be deductible by USSub even though the related debt
represents an investment by the lender in the United States.197 This
result is appropriate because the U.S.-source tax on corporate profits

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See supra Part II.C.1.
See supra Part II.C.3.
OECD, MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 151, at art. 9.
See supra text accompanying notes 143–44, 146, 158–59.
Compare supra Part II.B.1, with supra Part II.C.1.
See ALI, INTERNATIONAL TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 81, at 7; AVI-YONAH,
INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 53, at 5–6, 89–90.
197. The general international income tax rule is that interest has its source in the
debtor’s residence country. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 861(a)(1) (2012); ALI, INTERNATIONAL TAX
PROPOSALS, supra note 81, at 66–67; Schön, Debt-Equity, supra note 183, at 500. The
allowance of the interest deduction would be subject to the otherwise applicable interest
expense allocation and allowance rules. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 163, 861(b).
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is a net income tax, and deductions for real costs are required to
measure net income.198
E.

Summary

Thus, the end result of the effort to develop a policy baseline is
the conclusion that the United States should allow deductions for
payments for expenses (but not capital expenditures) made by U.S.
subsidiaries to foreign parent corporations if the deduction is
necessary to properly allocate income between the United States and
the foreign parent’s residence country. If a deduction is not required
under this principle, then it should be allowed only to the extent that
it is for a real current expense as opposed to a costless foreign related
party payment, a distinction explained in Part II.B.199
F.

Double Taxation

But what if the United Kingdom taxes USSub’s payments of
interest, royalties, and fees to UKCo? To the extent that these items
were nondeductible for U.S. tax purposes, they would also be part of
USSub’s U.S. taxable income.200 The resulting double taxation would
have a chilling effect on UKCo’s participation in the U.S. market.201
There is, however, a well-settled solution to this problem—customary
international law requires the United Kingdom to resolve the double
tax problem with a credit for the U.S. tax or an exemption for the
interest, royalties, and fees.202
III. SEARCHING FOR PROXIES AND ROUGH JUSTICE RULES
A. The Problem
The preceding discussion of a normative baseline suggests that a
theoretically correct approach to earnings stripping requires the
following difficult allocations regarding payments by foreigncontrolled U.S. subsidiaries to related foreign parties:
1. Interest payments must be divided between (i) interest on
loans to a U.S. subsidiary from purely intra-MNE funds
(nondeductible interest) and (ii) interest on loans to the U.S
subsidiary from funds supplied to the MNE by third-party
198. See supra Part II.B. USSub’s deduction is also required by the United States-U.K.
income tax treaty. See U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 20, at art. 25, para. 3.
199. See supra Part II.B.
200. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 139–44.
201. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Designing, supra note 9, at 401–02.
202. See id. at 402–03.
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creditors (deductible interest to the extent that the arm’s-length
benchmark is not exceeded);
2. Royalty payments must be divided between (i) a normal
return on the related foreign developer’s costs (deductible), (ii)
royalties that do no more than reimburse the MNE for royalties
paid to an unrelated party for intangibles licensed by the MNE
to the U.S. subsidiary (deductible), (iii) economic rents
(unresolved treatment), and (iv) all other royalty payments by
the U.S. subsidiary to the MNE (nondeductible); and
3. Payments for services provided by the MNE must be divided
between (i) a normal return on services costs (deductible), (ii)
payments that reimburse the MNE for actual services costs
(deductible), and (iii) any amount in excess of the arm’s-length
ceiling (nondeductible).
As discussed above,203 we would separately allocate economic rents
formally earned in the country of source.
These are difficult, complex allocations and they rely in part on
transfer pricing law that is widely and properly regarded as
problematic.204 These problems are magnified in the case of a large
MNE with many subsidiaries and many intra-MNE transactions.205
Thus, rules intended to achieve theoretically correct results may be
objectionable on the grounds that their enforcement and compliance
costs are too high and that sufficient accuracy cannot be achieved at
any cost. Moreover, a rule of complete disallowance for interest
payments on loans of purely intra-MNE funds may be politically
impossible. Consequently, it is appropriate to search for proxy rules
and rough justice approaches that are an acceptable compromise
between practical realities and theoretical correctness. The remainder
of Part III discusses this topic.
B.

Section 163(j) As a Rough Justice Provision
1. Identifying the Loopholes

Although earnings stripping can be effected to some extent
through payments of royalties and services fees, the largest amount is
203. See supra text accompanying notes 148–53.
204. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 93.
205. These problems would not be made easier by U.S. adoption of a territorial tax
regime that limited the U.S. corporate tax base to U.S.-source income. The difficult
allocations described in the text would still be required in order to make theoretically
correct distinctions between U.S.-source income and exempt foreign-source income. See
Wells, Whack-a-Mole, supra note 11, at 1433.
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accomplished through interest payments.206 We have previously
explained that § 163(j) is intended to constrain this type of earnings
stripping by limiting interest deductions but that the § 163(j)
constraint is so loose that it is not significantly effective.207 Perhaps a
practical solution for the largest part of the earnings stripping
problem is to tighten the parts of § 163(j) that trigger its application.
We will now investigate that approach.
The present version of § 163(j) prevents a U.S. corporation from
currently deducting its disqualified interest expense for any year with
respect to which its year-end debt-to-equity ratio is greater than 1.5 to
1.208 For this purpose, disqualified interest expense is calculated by
computing the part of each related party interest payment during the
year that is proportional to any treaty reduction in the U.S.
withholding tax on that payment and then aggregating those parts.209
However, the deduction disallowance cannot exceed the
corporation’s excess interest expense for the year.210 Under § 163(j),
excess interest expense is the amount by which net interest expense
(i.e., disqualified interest payments plus all other interest expense for
the year minus the year’s includible interest income) exceeds 50% of
adjusted taxable income.211 For this purpose, adjusted taxable income
is taxable income for the year increased by net interest expense and
certain other items.212
206. See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, EARNINGS STRIPPING, supra note 15, at 7, 21.
207. As stated by Jasper Cummings:
It seems that foreign acquirers have become adept at working around section
163(j). For example, the prospectus filed for the Chinese company purchase of
Smithfield Foods states that the cash will be provided by the Bank of China and
Morgan Stanley. The prospectus says the capitalization of the parent will be 40%
equity. That strongly suggests that the parties are intending to fit in the 1.5 to 1
debt-to-equity safe harbor for section 163(j). Alternatively, the 50% of adjusted
taxable income limitation can be easily accommodated in many cases.
Regulations under section 163(j) were proposed in 1991 and have never been
finalized. The proposed regulations are rarely cited, and section 163(j) itself is
seldom cited. This supports the view that while the section must be observed, even
the IRS considers it to be an ineffective preventer of deductions for interest paid
to foreign affiliates . . . .
Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Income Stripping by Interest Deductions, 141 TAX NOTES 971,
978 (2013).
208. I.R.C. § 163(j)(1)(A), (2)(A) (2012). For a detailed discussion of the earnings
stripping rules in § 163(j) and the proposed Treasury regulations issued under that
provision, see 2 KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 23, ¶ C3.04[5][d].
209. I.R.C. § 163(j)(3), (5)(B).
210. Id. § 163(j)(1)(A).
211. Id. § 163(j)(2)(B), (6)(B).
212. Id. § 163(j)(6)(A).
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The current § 163(j) limitations are generally intended to mimic
the cash flow debt payment coverage ratios that routinely are used by
lenders in credit agreements to assure that the borrower has sufficient
cash generating power to repay the loan.213 The carryover of
suspended interest allows the borrower flexibility and, assuming
constant cash flows, allows suspended deductions to be recouped as
debt is paid down.214 The limit of 50% of adjusted taxable income is
an arbitrary percentage that has not been reconsidered in light of
events occurring since its enactment in 1989 (including the 2008
financial crisis) and simply takes as given the remarkable latitude
afforded taxpayers to insert debt into MNE groups.215 Our prior
analysis demonstrates that, in essence, the § 163(j) rules elevate a
weak proxy for determining an arm’s-length interest amount over
considerations of inter-nation equity.216
The preceding summary shows that in the following situations,
§ 163(j) allows U.S. subsidiaries to deduct interest payments that
should not be deductible under the policy baseline that was
developed in Part II of this Article:
(i) The U.S. subsidiary manages to keep its debt-to-equity
ratio from exceeding 1.5 to 1, a fact that is irrelevant under the
Part II policy baseline with respect to interest;
(ii) The U.S. subsidiary manages to keep its disqualified
interest expense from being greater than a safe harbor ceiling
defined as the point at which the corporation’s net interest
expense for the year exceeds 50% of its adjusted taxable
income for the year, another fact that is irrelevant under the
policy baseline; and
(iii) The U.S. subsidiary’s interest payments are not subject to a
treaty-imposed reduction in the U.S. withholding tax, a point
that is also meaningless under the policy baseline.
In addition, § 163(j) allows an affected corporation to carry
nondeductible interest forward to future years when its deductibility
will continue to be governed by § 163(j).217 Finally, § 163(j) applies
only to interest deductions and does not impose any restrictions on a
213. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-386, at 567, 569–70 (1989) (Conf. Rep.); see also Hey,
supra note 77, at 342–43.
214. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-386, at 564–65, 567–68.
215. See id. at 567–68, 569–70; see also Shay, Mr. Secretary, supra note 14, at 474
(discussing Barclays Bank research analysts’ report that assumes a foreign-owned
Walgreens could add intercompany debt up to the § 163(j) limit).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 68–73, 206–12.
217. See I.R.C. § 163(j)(1)(B) (2012).
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U.S. subsidiary’s deductions for payments of royalties and services
fees to foreign related parties.218 Indeed, its design is based solely on a
debt paradigm.219
Section 163(j) is under-inclusive in several respects and, in those
cases, it needs to be strengthened. On the other hand, the present
version of § 163(j) is also over-inclusive in that it denies deductions
for interest payments that do not come within the loopholes described
in (i)–(iii) above but that do represent a real expense as explained in
Part II.B. Accordingly, in considering whether modifications that
strengthen § 163(j) might make it an acceptable approach, its overinclusiveness as well as its under-inclusiveness must be taken into
account. We now turn to that issue.
2. Strengthening Section 163(j)
To explore approaches for strengthening § 163(j), it will be
helpful first to illustrate the effects of the current version of that
provision. Examples 5, 6, and 7 serve this purpose. In each case, we
assume for simplicity that the USSub stock is the only asset of the
foreign parent.
Example 5: ForCo, a foreign corporation, owns all the shares of
USSub, a U.S. resident corporation. ForCo paid $100,000 for
the USSub stock and provided USSub with the remainder of its
capital by borrowing $900,000 from an unrelated bank and
lending this money to USSub on arm’s-length terms. All debt
formalities are observed. For year one, USSub has adjusted
taxable income of $100,000, and it pays $90,000 of interest on
the loan from ForCo. This payment constitutes USSub’s net
interest expense for the year, and it bears no U.S. withholding
tax because of an applicable treaty. ForCo pays the entire
$90,000 interest receipt to its bank lender.
USSub’s debt-to-equity ratio is considerably in excess of 1.5 to
1. In addition, the tax-free interest payment is disqualified
interest. Therefore, the $40,000 amount by which the $90,000
interest payment exceeds $50,000 (i.e., 50% of USSub’s
adjusted taxable income) is nondeductible interest for year 1
under the present version of § 163(j), even though it was
attributable to debt owed to an independent party. In this
factual context § 163(j) is over-inclusive.

218. See id. § 163(j)(1)(A).
219. See id.
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In our view, this result is incorrect. The $90,000 of interest paid
to ForCo and then paid onward to the bank lender was a real expense
rather than a costless foreign related party expense, and deduction
thereof should have been fully allowed instead of being limited to
$50,000. The $40,000 deduction disallowance would be correct only if
there were some policy standard that objectively characterized
$40,000 of USSub’s $90,000 of interest expense as normatively
excessive even though the facts of the example state that the full
$90,000 was an arm’s-length charge entirely attributable to unrelated
party debt and that all debt formalities were observed. We are not
aware of any such objective policy standard.220 Thus, present § 163(j)
is over-inclusive in Example 5.
Example 6: If, however, ForCo’s $900,000 loan to USSub had
come entirely from ForCo’s retained earnings, then USSub’s
$90,000 interest payment to ForCo would have been a costless
foreign related party expense for which no deduction should be
allowed. Nevertheless, present § 163(j) would allow USSub to
deduct the $50,000 of its interest payment that did not exceed
50% of USSub’s adjusted taxable income. In this factual
context, § 163(j) is under-inclusive.
Now consider a middle ground version of Examples 5 and 6.
Example 7: The facts are identical to Example 5 except that
one-half of the $900,000 loaned by ForCo to USSub came from
ForCo’s retained earnings, and the other one-half was
borrowed on arm’s-length terms from an independent bank
with both debts bearing the same 10% interest rate. Again,
USSub’s deduction for its $90,000 interest payment would be
limited to $50,000 by present § 163(j), but that is $5,000 too
much. In principle, only $45,000 would be properly deductible
because only that portion of the interest was allocable to thirdparty debt. The remaining amount is a costless foreign related
party payment that should be nondeductible. Thus, in this
scenario, current § 163(j) got the right answer with respect to
$45,000 of USSub’s $90,000 interest payment and the wrong
answer regarding $5,000 of the payment.

220. See Hey, supra note 77, at 344 (“The key issue in respect of any legislation limited
to ‘excessive’ intra-group interest is the lack of a normative basis for the definition of an
adequate level of debt.”). Shareholder loans that arguably exceed the debtor corporation’s
reasonable expected repayment capacity raise the question of whether the shareholdercreditors have an unqualified intention to enforce repayment or instead are making a
disguised equity investment. This issue does not usually arise when the creditor is an
unrelated party dealing at arm’s length with the debtor corporation.
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No principled rationale explains the results of these scenarios.
Clearly, current § 163(j)’s operation in Examples 5, 6, and 7 is
dependent on the largely unprincipled interaction of the chief
components of the § 163(j)(1)(A) excess interest expense limitation—
net interest expense and 50% of adjusted taxable income—221neither
of which has any necessary connection to the theoretically correct
approach for determining the deductibility of interest payments by
U.S. subsidiaries to foreign parents. We could present multiple
additional examples, but, in our judgment, those we have offered
show that current § 163(j) is too arbitrary in its operation to function
as an acceptable rough justice substitute for a principled approach to
limiting earnings stripping.
We can now consider addressing these problems by
strengthening § 163(j) along the various margins identified above. A
useful place to begin is with the feature of § 163(j) that excuses all
corporate debtors who prevent their debt-to-equity ratios from
exceeding 1.5 to 1.222 If that ratio were lowered or even eliminated,
more corporate debtors would be subject to the § 163(j) interest
deduction limitation.223
Note, however, that the 1.5 to 1 ceiling did not play any role in
the problematic results of Examples 5, 6, and 7, because the debtor’s
debt-to-equity ratio was greater than 1.5 to 1 in all three cases. In
other words, the erratic results in those three examples would have
occurred even if the debt-to-equity requirement of § 163(j) had been
reduced to less than 1.5 to 1 or eliminated. Thus, in our view,
tweaking § 163(j)’s leverage ceiling is not sufficient to cure the defects
illustrated in Examples 5, 6, and 7.224
221. See I.R.C. § 163(j)(2)(B).
222. See id. § 163(j)(2)(A).
223. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 101-386, at 567, 569–70 (1989) (finding the 1.5 to 1
debt-equity ratio to excuse many corporations with typical capital structures from any
potential disallowances and most net interest payments to be well under this threshold);
Cummings, supra note 86 (discussing the benefits of consolidating affiliated foreign
corporations owned by one common parent for tax filing purposes).
224. For purposes of § 163(j), a subsidiary’s debts that are owed to its parent are
generally taken into account in full for purposes of determining the subsidiary’s debt-toequity ratio even if the parent obtained the loan funds by borrowing at arm’s length from
an unrelated lender. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.163(j)-3(b), CCH, STANDARD FED. TAX
REP. 23355–56 (2013). This conflicts with our conclusion that when the unrelated-party
debt produces a real interest cost for the parent and the subsidiary’s interest payments are
a reimbursement of that cost, the disallowance scheme of § 163(j) should not apply to the
subsidiary’s interest expense. See supra text accompanying note 78. More broadly, this
indicates that the 1.5 to 1 debt-to-equity ratio is not a useful proxy for distinguishing
between real interest expenses and interest payments that are costless foreign related
party expenses.
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An additional possibility is to reduce present § 163(j)’s 50% of
adjusted taxable income safe harbor to something less—say 30%.225 If
that had been the case in Examples 5 and 7, then the safe harbor
ceiling in both examples would be $30,000 instead of $50,000. Thus, in
Example 5, $60,000 of USSub’s interest payment would be
nondeductible, and only $30,000 would be allowed. But this is even
less correct than the $40,000 deduction disallowance/$50,000
allowance result under the 50% ceiling that applied in the original
facts of Example 5 because, as previously explained, the correct
answer under the policy baseline for this “real expense” interest is
zero deduction disallowance/$90,000 allowance on account of the
related debt being owed to an independent creditor.
Example 7 presents a similar problematic outcome when a 30%
(instead of 50%) safe harbor ceiling is assumed. Again, USSub’s
interest deduction would be disallowed to the extent of $60,000, and
$30,000 would be allowed. However, because one-half of the $90,000
interest expense is a costless foreign related party payment as
explained in Part II, the nondeductible amount should have been
$45,000, and the deductible amount should have been the remaining
$45,000. Here, the deduction disallowance is $15,000 too large, and
the allowed amount is $15,000 too small.
The preceding observations should likely be disregarded if
empirical data can be found that shows that the interest deductions
properly disallowed by the current version of § 163(j) are
overwhelmingly greater than inappropriately disallowed deductions.
In that event, the over-inclusive effect of a tightened safe harbor
ceiling might be small enough to constitute an acceptable cost. That is
an empirical question that should be investigated. Although
reductions in its existing 50% safe harbor ceiling would provide
enhanced protection to the U.S. tax base, they would not cure erratic
effects of current § 163(j).
A final margin that suggests a possibility for strengthening
§ 163(j) is its feature that makes it inapplicable to interest payments
in the cross-border context unless they enjoy a treaty-based reduction
in the 30% U.S. withholding tax.226 This exception seems inconsistent
with § 163(j)’s anti-earnings stripping purpose because even if there
were no withholding rate reduction, so that the full 30% U.S. tax
applied to an interest payment, a U.S. subsidiary with a 35% U.S.
225. The safe harbor ceiling in the German interest deduction limitation rule is 30%.
See Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 12, at 141; Lee A. Sheppard, Interest Barriers Rise in
Europe, 141 TAX NOTES 251, 252 (2013).
226. See I.R.C. § 163(j)(3)(A), (5)(B) (2012).
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marginal income tax rate could still create a meaningful five
percentage point tax advantage by incurring a 30% withholding tax
on deductible interest payments to a foreign parent. This feature of
§ 163(j) seems ripe for modification, or, alternatively, the withholding
tax rate could be increased.
Nevertheless, the withholding tax treaty reduction requirement
played no role in creating the aberrant § 163(j) results that are
illustrated in Examples 5, 6, and 7 because those examples assumed
that an applicable treaty had reduced the U.S. withholding tax to
zero, thereby making this requirement irrelevant. Thus, § 163(j)
cannot be amended to achieve the appropriate results by tinkering
with or eliminating the presently existing treaty withholding tax
reduction requirement.
In our judgment, a version of § 163(j) that is tightened on any or
all of the three margins discussed above would still produce results
that are erratic in terms of the Part II policy baseline. In addition,
there seems to be no way to make § 163(j)’s structure applicable to
royalty and services fees payments.227 Indeed, the only thing that can
be said for the present iteration of § 163(j) is that its continued
existence may be better than allowing totally unrestrained earnings
stripping involving interest deductions. Nonetheless, it is difficult to
see how § 163(j), even if amended, will have any significant role to
play in developing a comprehensive and coherent approach to dealing
with earnings stripping.
C.

An Offsetting Withholding Tax As an Alternative to Deduction
Disallowance (The Wells/Lowell Proposal)

Commentators Bret Wells and Cym Lowell have proposed
addressing the earnings stripping problem by imposing a U.S. “baseprotecting surtax” on all deductible payments to foreign related
parties.228 Although they do not fully state the details, they do indicate
that the U.S. payor would withhold the tax at the time of the
payment, and the tax would be calibrated “to collect upfront the
expected U.S. tax that should be due with respect to the residual
profits that are represented by the base erosion payment.”229
The two authors acknowledge that actually calibrating the tax so
that it does no more, and no less, than remove the reward of earnings

227. See Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 12, at 142–44.
228. See Wells & Lowell, Tax Base Erosion, supra note 174, at 542, 604–08; see also
Hey, supra note 77, at 343–44.
229. See Wells & Lowell, Tax Base Erosion, supra note 174, at 605.
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stripping is a serious challenge.230 Over-inclusiveness and underinclusiveness are both potential problems with their proposal. That
challenge is avoided by adopting the nondeduction approach towards
earnings stripping payments that we have generally advocated in this
Article.
Of equal importance is the point that if the withholding tax is to
have a sound, principled basis, it will not apply to payments identified
as deductible under the analysis in Part II.B. Thus, the Wells and
Lowell proposal will involve the same allocation complexities as the
nondeduction approach. Thus, although we acknowledge that the
Wells and Lowell proposal would be an improvement over existing
law and is more coherent than current law § 163(j), we conclude that,
on balance, the nondeduction approach that we have developed in
this Article is preferable.
D. Should Nondeduction Be Limited to Payments into Low-Tax
Countries?
Notwithstanding the foregoing comprehensive theoretical
analysis, we recognize that the earnings stripping problem is most
acute with respect to deductible payments made to foreign related
parties that are resident in low-tax countries.231 Given that fact, would
a rule making deductibility contingent on the imposition of a
meaningful foreign residence country tax be a good alternative to a
more theoretically correct nondeductibility rule that requires difficult
allocations? This alternative rule would seem to be over-inclusive
because it would presumably apply to all payments to parties resident
in low-tax countries even if the payments should be deductible in
principle under the analysis in Part II.B. More importantly, this
alternative also would be under-inclusive because it would require the
United States to allow deductions for payments into high-tax
countries even though the deductions erode the U.S. tax base. Thus,
in our view, this approach would be an improvement over present
law, but, before adopting it, other more precise and comprehensive
proposals should be seriously considered.

230. See id. at 605 n.414, 608.
231. For background on earnings stripping, see J. COMM., CROSS-BORDER INCOME,
supra note 5, at 54, 58–59; U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 14,
at 10.
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Lodin’s Proposal

Swedish Professor Sven-Olof Lodin has developed another
approach for dealing with earnings stripping techniques involving
interest and royalty payments.232 Under Professor Lodin’s proposal,
the deductions for interest or royalties of legal entities would be
replaced by an equivalent inverted tax credit.233 In the case of interest
or royalties paid to unrelated payees, the credit amount would be
based on the current top domestic Swedish corporate tax rate of
26.3% (i.e., that rate multiplied by the borrower’s or licensee’s
interest or royalty costs).234 In the case of interest or royalties paid to
related payees, the credit amount would be at the rate that normally
applies to the lender’s or licensor’s interest or royalty income (i.e.,
that rate multiplied by the borrower’s or licensee’s interest or royalty
costs), but not in excess of the current top domestic Swedish
corporate tax rate of 26.3%.235 The proposal would allow a company
that reports a loss for the year in which the interest or royalty costs
are incurred to carry the credit forward in the same manner as losses
are carried forward under Swedish law.236 The proposal also would
apply to interest on loans that are indirectly made “by associated
companies through guarantees or loans, or their equivalent, to the
direct lender.”237 The purpose of this proposal is to eliminate the tax
arbitrage on related party interest or royalty payments that are
deductible by the payor but not taxable or taxable at only a low rate
in the hands of the related payee.238
This proposal, if adopted by the United States, would be a
significant improvement over current U.S. tax law. However, several
defects undercut its effectiveness. First, as Professor Lodin
acknowledges, a serious weakness of this proposal, as applied to
interest deductions, is the ease with which companies using
intermediaries in high-tax countries that had not adopted a similar

232. See generally Lodin II, supra note 67 (explaining inverted credit mechanism);
Sven-Olof Lodin, Intragroup Lending in Sweden—A Vehicle for International Tax
Arbitrage, 63 TAX NOTES INT’L 177 (2011) [hereinafter Lodin I] (describing a proposal
relating to interest deductions).
233. See Lodin II, supra note 67, at 1318.
234. See Lodin I, supra note 232, at 178; Lodin II, supra note 67, at 1317.
235. See Lodin I, supra note 232, at 178; Lodin II, supra note 67, at 1317. Unlike our
proposed analytical framework in this Article, Professor Lodin’s proposal does not deal
with services fees payments between related parties.
236. See Lodin I, supra note 232, at 178.
237. See id.
238. See Lodin II, supra note 67, at 1318–19.
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proposal could circumvent this proposal.239 In those cases, it would be
difficult for the tax authorities to follow the chain of intermediaries to
determine the final beneficiary of the interest payments.240 Second,
unlike our nondeduction for costless payments approach discussed
above, the Lodin proposal continues to allow income to be stripped
from the domestic tax base, but it reduces the incentive to do so by
limiting the tax benefit of the U.S. tax deduction to no more than the
foreign related party’s tax cost.241 Thus, unless the related party’s tax
cost were zero, deductible interest or royalty payments to foreign
related parties would still result in a revenue loss to the United States,
even though the payments do not represent a real cost. Third, to
implement its limitation on the tax benefits of the earnings stripping
interest and royalties expense deductions, the Lodin proposal seems
to require calculation of the related foreign payee’s “normal”
effective tax rate with respect to such items.242 This approach seems to
introduce the complexities of determining effective tax rates under
Code provisions such as § 954(b)(4).243 Finally, unlike our proposed
analytical framework in this Article, Professor Lodin’s proposal does
not deal with services fees payments between related parties. Thus,
on balance, we conclude that the approach that we have developed in
this Article is a more comprehensive and effective way of dealing with
the earnings stripping problem.
F.

The Obama Administration’s 2016 Budget Proposal Regarding
Thin Capitalization

As previously explained, § 163(j) does not limit a U.S.
corporation’s current deductions for related party interest payments
unless the corporation’s year-end debt-to-equity ratio exceeds 1.5 to 1
and the corporation’s net interest expense breaches a 50% of adjusted
taxable income ceiling for the year.244 Thus, so long as a U.S.
corporation’s debt level and interest expense are kept within these
limits, borrowing by related corporations that comprise a foreign
MNE can be structured so that the MNE’s debt and related interest
deductions are disproportionately located in high-taxed U.S.
subsidiaries instead of low-taxed foreign subsidiaries. The Obama
Administration’s 2016 fiscal year revenue proposals include a
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

See id. at 1318.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See, e.g., 1 KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 23, at ¶ B3.05[8].
See supra Part III.B.1.
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recommendation to limit the possibility of disproportionately
leveraging the U.S. subsidiaries of a foreign MNE.245
The Administration’s proposal provides that the U.S. interest
expense deduction of a member of a group of related corporations
covered by consolidated financial statements would be limited to the
sum of two components: (1) the member’s interest income and (2) the
proportion of the group’s worldwide net interest expense, computed
under U.S. tax principles, which is the same as the member’s
proportion of the group’s worldwide earnings (computed by adding
back the group’s net interest expense and certain other items).246
Although the proposed rule’s coverage would exclude financial
services entities and groups of related corporations with less than $5
million of net interest expense,247 coverage would be very broad
because MNEs generally use consolidated financial statements, which
is the principal touchstone for determining when the new proposal
would apply to a non-excluded entity.248 However, the proposal
provides that corporations subject to the new rule would be exempt
from the § 163(j) limitation.249 Thus, the effect of the proposal would
be to substantially curtail the application of § 163(j), without actually
repealing or amending it.
On the positive side, the proposal would strengthen the restraints
on interest deductions in that it would apply to corporations that
presently escape § 163(j) because their debt is managed so that it
avoids a breach of at least one of the § 163(j) limits referred to above.
Most inverted U.S. corporations seem to fall into this category,250 and
so the proposal would likely have a restraining effect on tax-driven
inversions.
The proposal’s deduction limitation would affect interest paid on
debt to unrelated parties and would conflict with the Part II policy
baseline discussed above.251 This may be justified on inter-nation
revenue allocation grounds, where the third-party debt is “over
allocated” to the United States to take advantage of the higher value
of the deduction at current U.S. corporate tax rates.

245. See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 14, at 10–12.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 11.
248. See id. at 10.
249. See id. at 11.
250. See Cummings, supra note 207, at 978.
251. See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 14, at 10–11; supra
Part II.E.
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The first component of the proposal’s limitation effectively
allows tracing to the extent that the U.S. subsidiary has interest
income. By privileging interest income in this way, it permits higher
levels of indebtedness in relation to the non-interest bearing assets of
the U.S. subsidiary borrower. Although this does not involve shifting
income to other countries, it would, nevertheless, reduce the U.S. tax
base by increasing the debt allowable in relation to non-interest
bearing business assets that generate higher margins. Thus, this first
component of the proposal reduces its effectiveness in remedying
earnings stripping involving interest deductions.
The proposal also would allow U.S. subsidiaries to elect into an
alternative interest deduction limitation defined as 10% of adjusted
taxable income.252 This election, like any other, is a one-way ratchet
that would create gaming opportunities for well-advised taxpayers;
the proposal would probably be improved by eliminating this
election. Finally, the proposal does not apply to services fees
payments or royalties,253 so, of course, it does not even attempt to do
anything about earnings stripping involving those types of payments.
On balance, the Administration’s proposal appears to be an
improvement over current law § 163(j). However, it is not clear that
the proposal need supersede § 163(j) nor is it clear that the proposal is
a more effective limitation on earnings stripping interest payments
than § 163(j) strengthened along the lines suggested in Part III.B.2.
G. Proportional Allocation
A reasonably simple and workable solution to the investment
allocation required by Part II.B.1 may lie in the principles that
“money is fungible and that interest expense is attributable to all
activities and property regardless of any specific purpose for incurring
an obligation on which interest is paid.”254 Using this principle and the
principles of § 864(e)(2) and the temporary regulations under § 861,255
a U.S. subsidiary’s share of a foreign-controlled MNE’s worldwide
interest expense on debt owed to independent parties could be
allocated to the U.S. subsidiary by referring to the ratio of the
subsidiary’s assets to the MNE’s worldwide assets, and then deducted
by the subsidiary. The subsidiary’s interest expense in excess of this
allocation would then be considered interest on intra-MNE debt that

252.
253.
254.
255.

See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 14, at 11.
See id. at 10–12.
53 C.F.R. § 1.861–9T(a) (2014).
Id. § 1.861–9T(g), (h), (j).
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is nondeductible. The subsidiary, however, would not be allowed to
deduct more than its actual interest payments. Anti-abuse rules would
be required to disregard spurious third-party debt involving loans
from a putative independent lender to the MNE followed by a loan
back to the putative independent lender or involving offsetting funds
deposited with the putative independent lender by the MNE. These
anti-abuse rules would admittedly increase the complexity of this
allocation approach, but workable rules of this variety have been
developed in other areas.256
Under this approach, all U.S. subsidiary interest payments would
be classified as deductible or nondeductible in the correct amounts
and the over- and under-inclusive results of current § 163(j), as
illustrated in Examples 5, 6, and 7, would be avoided. This approach
could be designed to work in conjunction with rules for allocating
interest expense of the U.S. branch of a foreign corporation. In our
view, this approach is the preferred way to deal with earnings
stripping interest payments.
IV. DO REVENUE CONSIDERATIONS MAKE ALL OF THE ABOVE
SUBSTANTIALLY POINTLESS?
If U.S. corporations receive more interest from foreign related
parties than foreign related parties receive from U.S. corporations,
would the United States be better off by adopting a treaty negotiation
policy that treats interest payments by domestic corporations to
foreign related parties as fully deductible for purposes of taxing
corporate profits in exchange for treaty partner reciprocity? Indeed,
the United States has already adopted a similar approach to the
withholding tax on cross-border interest payments by pursuing a
treaty negotiation policy of reciprocally reducing that tax to zero,257
even in the case of interest payments that are merely costless intraMNE transfers under the analysis explained in Part II.B.
Suppose that it were the case that U.S. corporations received
more interest from foreign related parties than vice versa and the
United States agreed by treaties to allow a full deduction for interest
paid by U.S. corporations to foreign related parties, thus removing
the interest from the U.S. corporate tax base, in exchange for foreign
treaty partners doing the converse. In such a case, the United States
could fully tax the inbound interest payments without having to allow
a foreign tax credit. The resulting revenue would, in theory, exceed
256. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.881–3 (2014) (the so-called anti-conduit regulations).
257. See 2006 U.S. MODEL, supra note 22, at art. 11, para. 1.
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the revenue lost from the United States allowing unlimited
deductions for interest payments by U.S. corporations to foreign
related parties. This might leave the United States in a better revenue
position than if it and its treaty partners took vigorous steps to limit
deductions for earnings stripping interest payments. Although that is
an empirical question that we do not resolve, the imprecise data that
is available indicates that U.S. corporations probably do not receive
more interest from foreign related parties than they pay to such
parties.258
Moreover, even if the United States would achieve a net revenue
gain from modifying its treaty network to achieve unlimited
reciprocal deductions for earnings stripping interest payments,
important negative aspects of earnings stripping explained in Section
I.F. would remain. Specifically, U.S. resident corporations that
compete with foreign MNEs in the U.S. market, but that are not
subsidiaries of foreign corporations, cannot generate income that
escapes U.S. tax by earnings stripping.259 This is the case because
these independent U.S. resident corporations have no foreign parent
to which they can make deductible payments. Thus, they are at a
disadvantage in the U.S. market with respect to foreign MNEs, and
this disadvantage would be increased if the United States allowed
unlimited earnings stripping. This disadvantage would depress the
profits of purely domestic U.S. corporations. It also would create a
diminution of the U.S tax base that would pro tanto offset the
revenue gain that might arise from reciprocal unlimited earnings
stripping. Regardless of the size of that offset, the discrimination
suffered by purely domestic U.S. corporations would be problematic.

258. For the 2010 tax year, U.S. corporations that claimed a foreign tax credit received
approximately $57 billion in interest from all foreign sources and paid approximately $55
billion of deductible interest to foreign creditors, both related and unrelated. See IRS
STATISTICS OF INCOME, TABLE 1-U.S. CORPORATION RETURNS WITH A FOREIGN TAX
CREDIT, 2010, available at www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Corporate-Foreign-Tax-CreditTable-1. See generally Nuria E. McGrath, Corporate Foreign Tax Credit, 2009, IRS
STATISTICS OF INCOME BULL., Summer 2013, at 125 (providing a detailed analysis of
foreign tax credit claims by U.S. corporations for the 2009 tax year). For 2006, the last prerecession tax year for which pertinent IRS data is available, U.S. corporations with $500
million or more of total receipts and with 25% or greater ownership by a single foreign
shareholder paid $53.4 billion of interest to foreign related parties and received $22.9
billion of interest from such parties. See Isaac J. Goodwin, Transactions Between Large
Foreign-Owned Domestic Corporations and Related Foreign Persons, 2008, IRS
STATISTICS OF INCOME BULL., Fall 2012, at 182, 183.
259. See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, EARNINGS STRIPPING, supra note 15, at 23, 26; OECD,
ACTION PLAN, supra note 31, at 8.
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There is an additional consequence from the foregoing
disadvantage to independent U.S. corporations that do business
exclusively in the United States. That consequence is a tax-subsidized
incentive for U.S. corporations to invert and for foreign corporations
to create or acquire U.S. corporations so that they can reap the
earnings stripping benefit that is unavailable to purely U.S. domestic
corporations. This incentive would be increased by a U.S. policy of
unlimited deductions for earnings stripping interest payments and the
result would be additional base erosion that would pro tanto offset
the hoped-for revenue gain from unlimited reciprocal earnings
stripping deductions.
In our judgment, the preceding points mean that the United
States should not move to a treaty policy that accommodates
reciprocal unlimited earnings stripping deductions. Even if there were
quantitative evidence of a revenue gain, we would be reluctant to
endorse a policy that systemically favored MNEs over domestic
businesses.
CONCLUSION
The term “corporate inversion” is used to identify several
transactional forms by which U.S. resident corporations are converted
into foreign corporations or into U.S. subsidiaries of foreign
corporations. These transactions are currently a large concern to U.S.
tax policy makers, and a lively debate is in progress regarding the best
way forward.
From a tax standpoint, corporate inversions are driven by the
triple objectives of (1) enabling inverting U.S. corporations to escape
U.S. taxation of their foreign-source income, (2) enabling U.S.
corporations to effectively repatriate foreign-source income without
paying a U.S. tax on such income, and (3) enabling those U.S.
corporations to move U.S.-source income out of the U.S. tax base by
means of deductible expense payments—a tactic known as crossborder earnings stripping. In previous work, we have explained how
the first two of these objectives could be forestalled if the definition
of a U.S. domestic corporation were broadened to include a
shareholder ownership test and if the U.S. international income tax
system were changed into a real worldwide system. In this Article, we
addressed ways to forestall the third objective by imposing limits on
earnings stripping.
Focusing on inversions, however, results in a view of earnings
stripping that is far too narrow. A principal emphasis of this Article
has been that earnings stripping presents challenges to the U.S. tax
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base that are much broader than corporate inversions, and so we have
developed an analytical framework for identifying responses to the
full menu of earnings stripping tactics, of which inversions are only a
part.
That framework showed that deductions for interest payments
on intra-MNE debt, which are the largest contributor to earnings
stripping, are also the most vulnerable to criticism from a policy
standpoint. Consequently, we examined various approaches to
limiting earnings stripping interest deductions and concluded that the
best promise lay in employing a proportionate allocation approach to
distinguishing between interest expenses that are deductible as real
costs and interest expenses that should be nondeductible because they
are costless foreign related party payments that do not effect a proper
inter-nation income allocation.
We concluded that distinguishing between properly deductible
and properly nondeductible royalty payments and payments for
services is much more difficult and requires reliance on transfer
pricing law. Fortunately, these items represent the smaller part of the
earnings stripping challenge.
Most importantly, cross-border earnings stripping is devastating
to the tax bases of both worldwide and territorial international tax
systems. Thus, action needs to be taken to curtail the use of earnings
stripping to erode the U.S. tax base without waiting to resolve the
controversy over whether the United States should adopt a territorial
system or instead significantly strengthen its badly flawed worldwide
system.

